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Abstract
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers
who make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their
long-term consequences. For any distribution of risks, there exists a consumer-optimal
information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending abstinence if riskiness is high
enough. Depending on the distribution of risks, more or less consumers may have to
be sacrificed in that they cannot be warned even though they would like to be. Under
a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible warning to abstain
must be tightened, but this need not increase the probability of harmful consumption.
If some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, traffic-light nudges
turn out to be optimal and, when subgroups of consumers differ sufficiently, the optimal
traffic-light nudge is also subgroup-optimal. We finally compare the consumer-optimal
nudge with those a health authority or a lobbyist would favor.
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1 Introduction
There has been a remarkable variety across space and time in attempts to alleviate the
consumption of potentially harmful goods. A particularly drastic policy is to prohibit those
goods altogether. This was done in the US in the 1920s with regard to alcohol. However,
Prohibition did not prevent illegal consumption: data suggests that, while consumption first
declined during Prohibition, it increased again after a few years, when the illegal market
had adapted; consumption remained stable after Prohibition ended (Miron and Zwiebel
(1991)). On top of being illiberal and leading to the criminalization of many people, this
extreme measure only achieved moderate results regarding drinking behavior (Hall (2010)).
A similar case has more recently been made against drug prohibition (Miron and Zwiebel
(1995)). The reason might be that prohibition does not credibly convey information about
the actual hazards of consumption.
Nowadays, a more liberal and more informative approach is to use information nudges.
For example, in many countries, cigarette packages now come with graphic information and
text messages about the potential consequences of smoking. Consumers take those warnings
as sources of information and react to such labels, at least to some extent (Hammond, Fong,
McNeill, Borland, and Cummings (2005)). Similar findings have been reported regarding
alcohol warning labels (MacKinnon, Pentz, and Stacy (1993)) and mandatory calorie posting
in chain restaurants (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011)).
Yet empirical research also documents that consumers do not feel properly addressed.
In a study with adolescents, McCool, Webb, Cameron, and Hoek (2012) report that many
participants questioned whether the graphic labels “portrayed an authentic representation
of the harm caused by smoking. Indeed, the majority perceived graphic warning labels as
‘showing the worst case scenario’ because, for example ‘of course no-one’s going to let their
foot get that bad.’” A targeted and more credible information nudge may have considerably
more potential. For example, warnings against drinking during pregnancy seem to have a
significant impact on those concerned (Hankin, Firestone, Sloan, Ager, Goodman, Sokol,
and Martier (1993)). Yet little is known about the optimal design of information nudges,
and what target groups to address best. This paper aims at filling this gap.
Our formal analysis relies on three ingredients: present-biased preferences, incomplete
information, and Bayesian updating. Let us examine each of these ingredients in turn.
Present-Biased Preferences In our model, a decision maker has to make a sequence of
consumption choices that may have harmful consequences in the future. The decision maker
is present-biased, in that he puts a disproportionate utility weight on the current period
compared to all later periods in time (Ainslie (1975, 1992), Thaler (1981), Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992)). In this context, his preferred course of action may look as follows:
Cheat today, but abstain from tomorrow on. Under no commitment, however, this course
of action is not feasible: once tomorrow is reached, the same logic applies so that cheating
“today” combined with abstaining from “tomorrow” on looks most appealing—again! As a
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consequence, every day becomes a cheating day, and consumption never comes to an end. A
decision maker aware of this misery may decide that quitting now is a smarter choice than
engaging in harmful consumption forever. Yet this choice may never feel appealing enough.
Thus, even though putting an end to harmful consumption now may dominate in terms
of overall utility, consuming forever may still be the only feasible outcome in intrapersonal
equilibrium, with possibly dreadful consequences.
Incomplete Information The decision maker has initially incomplete information about
the harmful consequences of consumption. This can be because their likelihood hinges on his
individual risk type, which he need not know with precision. This could for instance arise
if there is heterogeneity in risks across individuals; the decision maker then only has access
to risk statistics at the aggregate population level, but does not know his exact position in
this distribution, because it depends on a variety of risk factors he lacks the expertise to
assess and combine. Alternatively, one could think of a population of decision makers facing
an aggregate risk of unknown magnitude. In both interpretations, we assume that decision
makers do not know the actual risk they are facing; yet we assume that the distribution of
risks is common knowledge.
Bayesian Updating In this context, information nudges can help affecting a decision
maker’s incentives by modifying his information structure. Depending on the interpretation
of risk adopted, such nudges can be designed at the individual level, as in a doctor-patient
relationship, or at the population level, as in the case of tobacco, alcohol, or food warnings.
To avoid the negative effects of overstated consumption risks, we require that information
nudges be credible.1 We capture this requirement by assuming that the decision maker, when
exposed to new information about the harmful consequences of consumption, updates his
prior beliefs in a Bayesian way. This generates a tradeoff between the credibility of the nudge
and its efficiency at deterring consumption whenever it is undesirable. Building on results
from the Bayesian-persuasion literature, in particular Kolotilin (2015), we characterize the
optimal information structure from the decision maker’s perspective prior to taking any
consumption decision. Our own analysis starts with an extensive comparative-statics study
of the resulting consumer-optimal information nudge. We then tackle the more challenging
but more realistic case where different consumers can exhibit different biases for the present.
There always exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type. In
the corresponding persuasion mechanism, the decision maker either learns that the risk he
is facing is high or low, depending on whether it lies above or below a certain cutoff. The
intuition is that cutoff mechanisms have good efficiency properties, because consumption only
takes place when the risk is low enough, and that they also have good incentive properties,
because, under no commitment, abstention is incentive-compatible only when the risk is
1Of course, other types of nudges deter consumption via emotional reactions such as disgust (Hammond,
Fong, McDonald, Brown, and Cameron (2004)). We abstract from these different approaches in our analysis
and focus on the impact of information.
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perceived by the decision maker to be high enough. When there is heterogeneity in individual
risk types, these signals can be interpreted as recommendations warning against consumption
for high-risk individuals within the target group of the information nudge.2 When the risk
is an aggregate one, credible information about the hazards of consumption is conveyed to
the whole population. In either case, finding the optimal information nudge is easy in that
it requires pinning down one single parameter. What makes this task challenging is that it
requires a precise knowledge of the decision maker’s bias for the present.
The optimal cutoff structure outperforms perfect transparency because, by pooling risk
types above the cutoff, it enables more consumers to actually find the strength to abstain
from consuming once they have learned that they are of relatively high risk, though they
would have engaged in harmful consumption under full information. This contrasts with
a decision maker with no bias for the present, for whom perfect transparency would be
optimal (Blackwell (1953)). By tightening the target group, more drastic information can be
credibly communicated, thereby counteracting impulses from the decision maker’s bias for
the present. Indeed, such tightening may explain why warnings against alcohol work best
when they are targeted at the most vulnerable groups, such as pregnant women. Of course, in
practice, many more types should better abstain (Gutjahr, Gmel, and Rehm (2001), Shield,
Parry, and Rehm (2014)). Yet our analysis suggests that it may be optimal to warn only
high-risk types in order to deter at least them successfully, sacrificing types of lower but
still significant risk who will be trapped in harmful consumption. Key to this logic is that,
except possibly for marginal types, the optimal information structure is coarse: it is more
efficient to shield the maximum mass of types away from consumption by issuing a straight
recommendation to abstain, rather than to issue mixed messages that would only partially
protect inframarginal types.
We provide two sets of comparative-statics results for the consumer-optimal information
nudge. We first prove that a shift of the risk distribution towards higher levels of risk leads to
a strictly lower probability of consumption. This reflects two complementary effects. First,
such a shift makes abstinence more desirable; second, in line with the above properties of
cutoff mechanisms, it makes it easier to sustain abstinence in an incentive-compatible way.
We next investigate the impact of a shift in the decision maker’s level of self-control, as
measured by his bias for the present. Our main focus is on when harmful consumption
takes place under the optimal information nudge, and on how the probability of this event
is affected by changes in the decision maker’s bias for the present.3
Surprisingly, the answers to these questions turn out to depend on fine properties of the
distribution of risks. We first identify a weakening of the monotone-hazard-rate property
under which harmful consumption will take place under the optimal information nudge if and
2If the distribution of risks has atoms, we find that the recommendation to the marginal risk type may
involve randomization.
3Notice that harmful consumption is a behavioral property of our model that can be identified in the data
by asking subjects whether they would rather consume at all dates or abstain at all dates. The unhappy
smoker is a case in point.
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only if the decision maker’s bias for the present is severe enough. This condition, which bears
on the derivative of the upper-tail conditional expectation of risk, is tight, and we provide a
parametric example in which this intuitive property is not satisfied when the condition is not
met. However, this condition does not ensure that the probability of harmful consumption
is monotonic in the decision maker’s level of self-control—though a more severe bias for the
present always comes with a higher probability that consumption, be it harmless or harmful,
takes place. Indeed, it is easy to construct examples in which a lower bias for the present
leads to a higher probability that harmful consumption takes place. The basic tradeoff is that
abstinence is easier to incentivize for a decision maker with higher self-control—which tends
to reduce the probability of harmful consumption—but that such a decision maker is also
more sensitive to the hazards of consumption—which goes in the opposite direction. Which
effect dominates on average depends on the relative probability densities of two margins
of risk, that above which abstinence can be sustained, and that above which consumption
becomes harmful.
While the previous results rely on a fixed and known bias for the present, levels of
self-control in fact typically vary across consumers (Mischel (2014), Sutter, Kocher, Gla¨tzle-
Ru¨tzler, and Trautmann (2013)). For example, consumers with high self-control differ from
consumers with low self-control when it comes to food choice, as has been shown in a study
on the potential impact of product labeling on health (Koenigstorfer, Groeppel-Klein, Kamm
(2014)). This leads us to analyze the more realistic scenario in which decision makers may
have high or low self-control, a characteristic that is their private information. We focus on
the case in which a single information nudge has to be designed for an entire population of
consumers. This case is empirically relevant for tobacco, alcohol, or food warnings, for which
information nudges are often printed on the items consumers can choose from. Both types of
decision makers can then be optimally informed via the same information structure, which
turns out to take the form of a green-yellow-red traffic-light nudge. While the strongest,
red warning label is drastic enough to make both decision makers with high and with low
self-control abstain, the intermediate yellow warning label convinces at least decision makers
with high self-control to abstain.
Our results are threefold. When the two types of decision makers are sufficiently different
in terms of self-control, they exert no externality on each other in that their individually
optimally information nudges can be combined into a single traffic-light nudge with no effect
on incentives. This traffic-light nudge is monotone in that it has a two-cutoff structure: a
green label is issued for low levels of risk, a yellow one for intermediate levels, and a red one
for high levels, with the same cutoffs as under the individually optimal nudges. When the
two types of decision makers become more alike in terms of self-control, a monotone traffic-
light nudge remains optimal, but the corresponding cutoffs have to be modified to preserve
incentive compatibility, which notably requires that high self-control consumers abstain when
a yellow warning is issued; hence the two types exerts an externality on each other, and it may
become optimal, depending on relative population shares, to sacrifice one type to the benefit
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of the other. This discrimination property may be a reason why traffic-light nudges, which
are intuitively perceived as monotone, are one if not the most frequently used nonnumerical
information structures, in addition to their potential saliency.4 However, when the two types
of decision makers are very similar in terms of self-control, the monotonicity of the optimal
traffic-light nudge may be lost and a three-cutoff mechanism may become optimal, whereby
a yellow warning is issued for both intermediate and extreme levels of risk. In that case, the
intuitive content of traffic-light nudges is more questionable.
Returning to our baseline model, we finally compare the consumer-optimal information
nudge with the optimal information nudge from the perspective of a health authority aiming
at minimizing the probability of consumption, as well as with the optimal information nudge
from the perspective of a lobbyist aiming at maximizing the probability of consumption. The
cutoff structure of optimal incentive-compatible persuasion mechanisms carries over when
one changes the objective function to a health authority’s or a lobbyist’s. Yet, of course, the
cutoffs are chosen differently. While the health authority prefers to make as many consumers
as possible shy away from harmful consumption, the lobbyist prefers to lower willpower in
as many consumers as possible by convincing them that the risk is not that high. In the
latter case, many consumers who would wish for an information nudge that helped them
abstaining, are instead trapped in harmful consumption. Naturally, the lobbyist chooses
the cutoff of the persuasion mechanism such that as few consumers as possible receive a
convincing signal to abstain, while the health authority does exactly the opposite. A policy
maker who would not take consumers’ self-control problems into consideration may even
misinterpret information structures implemented by a lobbyist as health-concerned, when,
indeed, the target group for a warning label has been chosen deliberately broadly in order
to reduce the impact of the nudge. Note finally that, from a liberal perspective, it would be
ideal to choose the cutoff in the consumer-optimal persuasion mechanism in such a way that
consumption is recommended if and only if it involves no harm. Yet, as we have seen, under
the weak conditions on the distribution of risks we identify, this mechanism is incentive-
compatible if and only if the decision maker’s bias for the present is low enough. In all other
cases, harmful consumption takes place with positive probability, and the consumer-optimal
information nudge coincides with the one a health authority would favor.
Related Literature
Our paper lies at the intersection of three strands of literature. First, our work is related to
the literature on present-biased preferences and information acquisition pioneered by Carrillo
and Mariotti (2000) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2002); specifically, we take the basic model of
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) as our starting point. However, while the literature has so far
emphasized situations in which present-biased decision makers manipulate the information-
acquisition or the information-storing processes, we characterize information structures that
4Though evidence on the latter is mixed, see VanEpps, Downs, and Loewenstein (2016).
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are optimal, given a decision maker’s bias for the present, from different perspectives. While
the basic insight remains that gathering no information may outperform full transparency,
our analysis demonstrates that an intermediate information structure is best, and can be
interpreted as an information nudge acting as a credible warning signal to a specific target
group. This solves two problems that may appear when the task of gathering information
is performed by the decision maker himself. The first is the multiplicity of equilibria arising
from the difficulty to coordinate one’s selves on an intrapersonal equilibrium. The second
is that gathering information oneself creates an additional risk by making different pieces
of information available only sequentially; as a result, some types may end up trapped in
harmful consumption, whereas they would completely abstain if they were instead exposed
to the coarser consumer-optimal information nudge.
Second, the information-design problem we study connects our paper to the recent and
very active literature on Bayesian persuasion initiated by the seminal papers of Brocas and
Carrillo (2007), Rayo and Segal (2010), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), and especially, in
the continuous-state case, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016). In that our information designer
has linear preferences about which risk types should better abstain, our baseline model is
most closely related to the setting of linear, type-dependent sender preferences in Kolotilin
(2015), which we follow to derive the consumer-optimal information nudge. Our analysis
starts with the comparative statics of this nudge, notably with respect to the decision-maker’s
bias for the present. But our main methodological contribution to the Bayesian-persuasion
literature lies in the analysis of optimal traffic-light nudges under present-bias heterogeneity.
Similar to Guo and Shmaya (2019), we find that the optimal information nudge can be
implemented by an interval structure of warnings. The reason for the optimality of interval
structure is, however, different. In Guo and Shmaya (2019), it stems from monotonicity
of likelihood-utility ratio over receiver types, an assumption that is violated in our model.
Intuitively, this is because, in our model, disagreement on the right action between low- and
high-self-control consumers is the strongest for intermediate risk types. As a result, when
consumers’ self-control levels become very similar in our model, a nonmonotone traffic-light
nudge can be optimal.
What sets our paper apart from most of the Bayesian-persuasion literature is that our
focus is on frictions in information demand that arise from intrapersonal, psychological
conflicts rather than from sender-receiver conflicts of interest. Depending on the mechanism
designer’s objective, the optimal persuasion mechanism varies drastically. Our paper thereby
contributes to a small but growing literature on the optimal disclosure of information to
agents with psychological preferences. Lipnowski and Mathevet (2018) show that a tempted
agent in the sense of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) does not want to know what he is missing,
and thus an optimal disclosure mechanism should limit his information about the value of his
preferred choice, so as to reduce the cost of self-control. Schweizer and Szech (2018) study
the optimal revelation of life-changing information, such as that provided by a medical test,
to a patient with anticipatory utility. Closer to Be´nabou and Tirole (2002), Habibi (2018)
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studies feedback mechanisms in a setting where a benevolent principal motivates an agent
with present-biased preferences to exert unobservable effort by providing him with feedback
based on a noisy signal that depends on both the agent’s type and effort; this provides a
moral-hazard counterpart to our analysis.
Popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), the literature on nudging is growing fast
and into multiple directions, with remarkable success also on a political level. Research on
nudging has informed policy making in various countries, such as in the US, UK, Australia,
Germany, and Japan. Also the UN, the OECD, and the World Bank have set up nudging
units. While contributions such as Benkert and Netzer (2018) focus on nudging in the sense
of influencing the framing of decision problems, our focus is on nudges in the form of an
optimized release of information, so called information nudges.5 Such nudges in the form of
warning signals or labels have already received much attention in previous decades, notably in
the marketing literature; see Argo and Main (2004) for an overview. We address the design
of credible information nudges for populations of heterogeneous decision makers who are
present-biased, and compare optimal information nudges from different policy perspectives.
While the optimal nudge can always be represented as a warning signal to a target group, the
size of the target group and the according signal can vary drastically according to the political
goal. Policy makers unaware of or underestimating consumers’ self-control problems risk to
implement an information nudge that completely misses its goal. It may even maximize
consumption when minimizing consumption is intended.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes
optimal information disclosure. Section 4 gathers our comparative statics results. Section 5
studies the case of a mixed population in which some consumers suffer from more severe self-
control problems than others. Section 6 considers alternative objective functions. Section 7
concludes. Proofs not given in the text can be found in Appendices A and C.
2 The Model
As in Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), we focus on a time-inconsistent decision maker (he) who
makes sequential consumption decisions under no commitment. Consumption is enjoyable in
the short term but possibly has harmful consequences in the long term. The novelty of the
model is that the decision maker’s information about the inherent riskiness of consumption
is optimized by a mechanism designer (she).
2.1 Actions and Payoffs
The decision maker lives at dates τ = 0, 1, 2, 3. At dates τ = 0, 1, he can consume, xτ = 1,
5Coffman, Featherstone, and Kessler (2015) study information nudges assuming agents have mean-
variance preferences. They focus on the comparative statics of agents’ decisions in reaction to different
nudges. In contrast, our focus is on characterizing optimal information nudges.
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or abstain, xτ = 0. Consuming at any date τ increases current utility by 1 but comes with
probability θ at a cost C, incurred at date τ + 2. Following Phelps and Pollak (1968) and
Laibson (1997), the decision maker discounts future payoffs according to a quasi-hyperbolic
discount function with parameters β and δ. That is, his vNM utility functions at dates 0
and 1 are given by
U0(x0, x1, θ) = x0(1− βδ2θC) + x1βδ(1− δ2θC), (1)
U1(x0, x1, θ) = −x0βδθC + x1(1− βδ2θC), (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time-inconsistency parameter capturing the bias for the present
relative to the future, while δ ∈ (0, 1] is the usual per-period discount factor. As β < 1,
the decision maker at date 1 puts, relatively to his utility from consuming, less weight on
the harm his consuming might cause at date 3 than he does at date 0. We assume that
βδ2C > 1, so that the decision maker would always abstain if he believed that the cost C
were incurred with probability 1 upon consuming.
2.2 Information and Strategies
The prior beliefs of the decision maker about the riskiness θ are represented by a distribution
P with cumulative distribution function F over [0, 1]. We denote by θ and θ the infimum
and the supremum of the support Θ of P, respectively.
Before making his first consumption decision at date 0, the decision maker is exposed
to additional information about θ. This information is distilled by a mechanism designer
who knows the value of θ and can commit to a persuasion mechanism issuing messages
conditional on that value. The decision maker then updates his beliefs about θ in a Bayesian
way whenever that is possible.
As in Strotz (1956), however, the decision maker is unable to commit to a course of
action contingent on his updated beliefs. This restriction is binding, because the preferences
induced by (1)–(2) along with these beliefs are time-inconsistent as β < 1. Following Peleg
and Yaari (1973), the date-0 and date-1 selves of the decision maker act as independent
decision units. The decision maker is sophisticated, so that his behavior is described by a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the resulting intrapersonal game.
In most of our analysis, the mechanism designer is benevolent in that her interests are
aligned with those of the decision maker at date 0. Alternative objective functions for the
mechanism designer are considered in Section 6.
2.3 Applications
Our model applies to situations in which a mechanism designer can determine how much
information she wants to reveal regarding the riskiness θ. She can pool information by issuing
a coarse signal. Yet she needs to stick to the truth: that is, she cannot fool Bayesian decision
makers by systematically lying to them. Depending on the application, the riskiness may
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be a characteristic of the product the decision maker can consume, a characteristic of the
decision maker himself, or a combination of the two.
In the first case, information structures are typically identical for a whole population.
Think, for example, of information nudges on food and beverages in a supermarket, indicating
how healthy a specific choice would be. If the information nudge is printed on the item itself,
the mechanism designer decides if she wants to disclose the riskiness of a product, or if she
prefers to pool information about different products. For example, she could decide whether
a snack is labeled as a healthy, green-label item or as an unhealthy, red-label item. More
detailed information can be provided by a traffic-light nudge.
In the second case, the mechanism designer may be able to individually address different
consumers, and thereby make use of more personalized signals. An example is information
nudging in a supermarket via smart glasses or smartphones. Another case in point is medical
advice: for instance, a doctor or a medical agency may have superior information about a
patient’s riskiness, and optimize the way it is communicated to him in order to influence his
behavior.6 In the latter case, the riskiness is an individual characteristic of the patient. The
doctor can choose to disclose it to her patient perfectly, but she can also only tell him that
he belongs to a group of smaller or larger riskiness.
A key observation in that respect is that, even if the decision maker has some private
information, he may still lack the ability to translate it into his individual riskiness. This
essentially amounts to having no private information at all, and, hence, room for information
design opens up. For example, consider a decision maker deciding between consuming now
or saving towards retirement. The probability θ then corresponds to his individual survival
probability. Assume that the decision maker has some knowledge of survival probabilities,
but only at the aggregate population level. Then, although he may have information about
his age, socioeconomic status, health and other factors, he need not know how to combine
these factors to compute his individual survival probability.7 The mechanism designer has
access to the relevant computation model and can offer him personalized information. Again,
she may decide to issue a coarse signal pooling decision makers of different riskiness.
From now on, and bearing in mind the above two interpretations of the model, we shall
uniformly refer to θ as the decision maker’s type.
2.4 The Intrapersonal Game
As a preliminary step, we focus on the intrapersonal game played by the decision maker’s
date-0 and date-1 selves following the issue of some message by the mechanism designer.
Owing to the binary character of consumption decisions and to the linearity of utilities in θ,
6For economic studies in this context, see, for instance, Caplin and Leahy (2004), Ko¨szegi (2003), and
Schweizer and Szech (2018).
7As a stark example, Hurwitz and Sade (2017) find that, compared to nonsmokers, smokers more rarely
prefer the lump-sum option when life insurance money is paid out; actually, they do not think that they
have a shorter life expectancy than nonsmokers either.
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equilibrium behavior in this intrapersonal game only depends on the decision maker’s mean
posterior belief θˆ about θ following this message. Letting
ta ≡ 1
βδ2C
∈ (0, 1), (3)
our first result is a direct consequence of (1)–(2).
Lemma 1 Given a mean posterior belief θˆ about θ, the intrapersonal game has a unique
efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which the decision maker’s date-0 and date-1 selves
both consume if θˆ < ta and both abstain if θˆ ≥ ta.
Observe from (1) that, if βta < θˆ < ta, then the decision maker at date 0 would be
strictly better off consuming at date 0 and abstaining at date 1. However, there is no way
he can reach this outcome under no commitment. Notice also that there is a discontinuity
in the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff at θˆ = ta. Indeed, letting
th ≡ 1 + βδ
1 + δ
ta ∈ (0, ta), (4)
if th < θˆ < ta, then the decision maker at date 0 would be strictly better off abstaining at
both dates than consuming at both dates, and the more so, the closer θˆ is to ta. Yet, under
no commitment, he cannot help doing so; we say that harmful consumption then takes place
in equilibrium. The resulting discontinuity in the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff
arises from his bias for the present: in the limiting case β = 1, the gap between th and ta
vanishes, and the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff is continuous in θˆ; indeed, it is
convex in θˆ, reflecting that the value of information for a time-consistent decision maker is
always nonnegative (Blackwell (1953)).
Remark The equilibrium outcome described in Lemma 1 is unique if θˆ 6= ta. If θˆ = ta,
then both the date-0 and the date-1 selves are indifferent between consuming and abstaining,
whereas the date-0 self strictly prefers that the date-1 self abstains, and reciprocally. Because
the date-0 self can do nothing to influence the behavior of the date-1 self, and reciprocally,
there is a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibria in which both the date-0 and the date-
1 self abstain with arbitrary probabilities in [0, 1]; yet, according to (1)–(2), the efficient
equilibrium arises when they both abstain with probability 1. We focus on this equilibrium
for three reasons.
1. First, as our goal is to characterize the best persuasion mechanism from the perspective
of the decision maker at date 0, it is natural to select the continuation equilibrium that
maximizes the payoff of the date-0 self, leaving the date-1 self indifferent.
2. Second, and more subtly, mean posterior beliefs θˆ equal to the cutoff ta will play a key
role in our analysis, and it is crucial for the existence of optimal persuasion mechanisms
that the continuation equilibrium given such beliefs be efficient.
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3. Third, no matter the selected continuation equilibrium, there exists for each ε > 0
an ε-optimal persuasion mechanism that induces posterior beliefs such that the above
tie-breaking issue never arises.
For these reasons, we disregard equilibria of the intrapersonal game other than the efficient
one and proceed as if the decision maker’s behavior given any mean posterior belief about θ
were uniquely determined.
Figure 1 illustrates the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff as a function of θˆ.
-
θˆ1tath
6
U0
1 + βδ
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Figure 1: The decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff.
2.5 Suboptimality of Full Information Revelation
If the decision maker had no bias for the present or could commit to a course of action,
full information would be optimal from his perspective at date 0. As shown by Carrillo and
Mariotti (2000), however, this is no longer the case if he suffers from a self-control problem.
Intuitively, this follows from the nonconvexity of his equilibrium payoff as a function of his
mean posterior belief, as illustrated in Figure 1. To see this point more formally, suppose
E[θ] ≥ ta and th < E[θ |θ < ta] < ta.
The first inequality implies that, if the decision maker stayed with his prior, then he would
abstain at both dates and thus obtain a zero payoff. Together with (1) and (3)–(4), the
second inequality implies
E[U0(1, 1, θ) |θ < ta] < 0.
Hence, if the decision maker were to learn that θ < ta, then he would on average derive a
negative payoff from consuming at both dates, an outcome which, according to Lemma 1,
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he could not prevent from happening under no commitment. Because learning that θ ≥ ta
would in any case not affect his behavior relative to his prior, the decision maker thus strictly
prefers to stay with his prior and abstain at both dates, rather than learning the value of θ
and possibly getting trapped in harmful consumption.
3 Optimal Information Disclosure
3.1 Persuasion Mechanisms
The above argument shows that, because full transparency can destroy beneficial beliefs
that help overcome temptation, the value of becoming perfectly informed relative to staying
ignorant can be negative from the perspective of the decision maker at date 0. However, this
comparison is extreme, and does not shed light on the date-0 optimal information structure.8
We now tackle this issue, building on the Bayesian-persuasion literature initiated by Brocas
and Carrillo (2007), Rayo and Segal (2010), and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
Following Aumann (1964), there is no loss of generality in focusing on measurable direct
persuasion mechanisms x : Θ×Ω→ {0, 1} issuing, for any type θ ∈ Θ and for any element ω
of some sample space Ω, a recommendation x(θ, ω) to abstain (0) or to consume (1) at dates
0 and 1.9 As in Aumann (1964), we can take Ω to be [0, 1], endowed with Lebesgue measure
λ over the Borel sets. To any measurable direct persuasion mechanism x : Θ × Ω → {0, 1}
corresponds a measurable mapping pi : Θ→ [0, 1] that associates to each θ ∈ Θ a probability
pi(θ) = λ[{ω ∈ Ω : x(θ, ω) = 1}] (5)
of issuing a recommendation to consume at dates 0 and 1. Conversely, it follows from
Aumann (1964, Lemma F) that, for any measurable mapping pi : Θ → [0, 1], there exists
a measurable direct persuasion mechanism x : Θ × Ω → {0, 1} such that (5) holds for all
θ ∈ Θ. In line with Kolotilin, Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk, and Li (2017), we will mostly work
with this equivalent and more convenient probabilistic representation of mechanisms, but we
will occasionally rely on the original formulation.
3.2 Incentive Compatibility and Optimality
In this section, we formulate the relevant incentive constraints and the mechanism designer’s
optimization problem, and characterize the optimal information nudge. We throughout
assume relatively little structure on the decision maker’s prior beliefs: the distribution P
may be discrete, continuous, or mixed. The only restriction we impose is that the support
Θ of P be sufficiently spread out.
8Carillo and Mariotti (2000) discuss the case where the decision maker has access to noisy samples about
θ. We compare this situation to optimal information design in Appendix B.
9No other recommendation would be followed by the decision maker, because his equilibrium behavior in
any information state is uniquely determined, in the sense explained in Section 2.4.
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Assumption 1 P[θ ≤ th] > 0 and P[θ > ta] > 0.
Because th < ta, this, in particular, implies θ < ta < θ.
A difference between our setting and standard models of Bayesian persuasion is that the
decision maker cannot implement an optimal course of action conditional on his information;
rather, his behavior results from a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game played by his
date-0 and date-1 selves. In particular, there are information states in which the decision
maker would be strictly better off abstaining but cannot help consuming. This reflects that
abstention is not a simple default option in our setup: the decision maker abstains only if he
perceives the potential consequences from consumption to be drastic enough. As a result,
we cannot write his incentive constraints in the usual way.
Consider a mechanism pi under which both recommendations to consume and to abstain
are sent with positive probability, which allows for straightforward applications of Bayes’
rule. By Lemma 1, complying with the recommendation to consume is consistent with a
continuation equilibrium if and only if E[θ |x(θ, ω) = 1] < ta, that is,
E[θpi(θ)]
E[pi(θ)]
< ta. (6)
Similarly, complying with the recommendation to abstain is consistent with a continuation
equilibrium if and only if E[θ |x(θ, ω) = 0] ≥ ta, that is,
E[θ[1− pi(θ)]]
E[1− pi(θ)] ≥ t
a. (7)
More generally, the left-hand side of constraint (6) is not well defined if pi = 0 P-almost
surely, and similarly the left-hand side of constraint (7) is not well defined if pi = 1 P-almost
surely. We adopt the convention that the undefined constraint is then emptily satisfied. A
mechanism pi is incentive-compatible (IC) if it satisfies (6)–(7).
Given the expression (1) for U0(1, 1, θ), the optimal-design problem can then, up to a
multiplicative constant (1 + δ)/ta, be formulated as
max{thE[pi(θ)]− E[θpi(θ)] : pi is IC}. (8)
Observe that the objective function in (8) as well as the constraints (6)–(7) are all affine in
pi. Due to this simple structure, deriving the optimal IC persuasion mechanism lies within
scope of earlier results in the Bayesian-persuasion literature, in particular those of Kolotilin
(2015). This quickly leads us to Proposition 1, which offers such a characterization in our
setup. Appendix A offers a self-contained derivation of this result.
It turns out that we can with no loss of generality restrict attention to cutoff mechanisms.
Such a mechanism recommends to consume (abstain) if θ is below (above) a cutoff, with
possible randomization between the two recommendations at the cutoff, that is,
pi(θ) = 1{θ<t} + a1{θ=t}
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for some pair (t, a) ∈ Θ× [0, 1]. In particular, we denote by pi∗γ the unique cutoff mechanism
that recommends to consume with probability γ = E[pi∗γ(θ)],
pi∗γ(θ) = 1{θ<tγ} +
γ − F (t−γ )
F (tγ)− F (t−γ )
1{θ=tγ} (9)
where tγ ≡ inf {θ : F (θ) > γ}, with 00 = 1 and inf ∅ =∞ by convention. If the distribution
P is nonatomic, then the second term on the right-hand side of (9) is irrelevant. Conversely,
if this term is strictly positive, then tγ is an atom of P and the mechanism pi
∗
γ involves
randomization at tγ unless γ ∈ {F (t−γ ), F (tγ)}. The following lemma, which is justified
in detail in Appendix A, identifies two properties of cutoff mechanisms that are crucial
throughout our analysis.
Lemma 2 The following holds:
(i) Among all mechanisms pi such that E[pi(θ)] = γ, pi∗γ minimizes E[θpi(θ)].
(ii) If a mechanism pi with E[pi(θ)] = γ is IC, then pi∗γ is IC as well.
The intuition is that cutoff mechanisms are good for efficiency purposes, because they
recommend consuming for values of θ such that consumption is the most valued by the
decision maker, and that they also have good incentive properties, because they recommend
abstaining when the news about θ is the most alarming.
The two parts of Lemma 2 together imply that designing the optimal IC persuasion
mechanism boils down to finding the optimal γ ∈ [0, 1] and implementing the corresponding
cutoff mechanism. There is a case distinction. The objective in (8) is maximized by the
unconstrained-optimal mechanism pi∗γu with γ
u = F (th), which recommends to consume
whenever the net benefit th − θ from consuming is nonnegative. Whenever pi∗γu is IC, it
solves (8). Otherwise, the constraint (7) becomes binding.
Proposition 1 If the following holds:
E[θ |θ > th] ≥ ta, (10)
then the optimal IC persuasion mechanism is pi∗γu. Otherwise, the optimal IC persuasion
mechanism is pi∗γc , where
E[θ[1− pi∗γc(θ)]]
E[1− pi∗γc(θ)]
= ta (11)
implicitly defines the probability γc > γu of consuming.
Thus harmful consumption takes place under the optimal IC persuasion mechanism if
and only (10) does not hold. The key insight of (11) is that, following the recommendation to
abstain, the decision maker is on the verge of falling into the harmful-consumption interval
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(th, ta), as his mean posterior belief about θ is just at the critical level ta and is thus just
high enough to induce him to abstain. This in turn reflects that the probability of issuing
a recommendation to abstain is chosen to alarm the decision maker in an optimal way: any
higher value would undermine the credibility of the mechanism, whereas any lower value
would make the recommendation to abstain inefficiently alarming. An optimal balance is
thus achieved between the credibility and the efficiency of the mechanism. The optimal
information nudge then only targets high-risk types to the detriment of—potentially a very
sizable mass of—lower-risk types that would prefer a warning as well. The optimal nudge
has to sacrifice the latter in order to convince at least the highest-risk types to abstain.
An example of such selective nudging may be alcohol warnings that target pregnant women
instead of the whole population of consumers who should better drink less.
For future reference, we provide a more explicit characterization of γc in case (10) does
not hold. If the equation
E[θ |θ > t] = ta (12)
has a solution t = tc, then γc = F (tc) and pi∗γc = 1{θ≤tc}. If P has atoms, however, then such
a solution need not exist because the mapping t 7→ E[θ |θ > t] is discontinuous at the atoms
of P. In that case, the optimal IC persuasion mechanism may necessitate randomization to
achieve an equality in (7). Let us then define tc as the supremum of the set of cutoffs that
are too small to satisfy (12),
tc ≡ sup{t ∈ [0, ta] : E[θ |θ > t] < ta}, (13)
which is well defined under Assumption 1. Because E[θ | θ > t] is right-continuous in t, it
follows that either (12) is satisfied by tc or (12) has no solution. In the latter case, we have
P[θ = tc] > 0, E[θ | θ ≥ tc] ≤ ta, and E[θ | θ > tc] > ta. If the second of these inequalities
holds with equality, then it is optimal to recommend to abstain for sure at θ = tc and
pi∗γc = 1{θ<tc}. By contrast, if this inequality is strict, recommending to abstain for sure at
θ = tc would undermine the credibility of the mechanism, while recommending to consume
for sure at θ = tc would make the recommendation to abstain inefficiently alarming. Then
γc is implicitly defined by (9) and (11) with
tγc = inf {θ : F (θ) > γc} = tc
reflecting how randomization enables us to interpolate through possible discontinuities of F .
Notice, to conclude, that there are multiple ways of implementing the optimal IC persuasion
mechanism: for instance, consumption for types θ < tc can indifferently be triggered by fully
disclosing these types, or by sending the message that θ < tc. Thus, the optimal information
nudge does not have to be simple—but it can be. What is crucial is the composition of the
target group that receives a warning against consumption.
15
4 Comparative Statics
In our study of comparative statics, we assume for simplicity that P is nonatomic, with full
support over [0, 1]. Then the optimal IC persuasion mechanism recommends to abstain when
θ > t∗ ≡ max{th, tc}, where tc is defined by (13). The more interesting scenario arises when
(10) does not hold, so that the optimal IC mechanism pi∗γc involves harmful consumption and
tc > th is the unique solution to (12). As a result, one also has tc < ta: thus there are types
close to but below ta, for which harmful consumption would necessarily take place under
complete information, but which are completely neutralized under pi∗γc . That t
c > th reflects
that consumption must take place for types for which consumption is slightly harmful to
preserve the credibility of the mechanism when it recommends to abstain for types for which
consumption is more harmful, but would nevertheless take place if these types were disclosed.
4.1 Changes in the Distribution of Risks
In the case where (10) does not hold, the characterization (12) of the cutoff tc leads to
straightforward comparative statics in terms of the distribution P. Suppose for instance
that P dominates P in the hazard-rate order, that is,
1− F
1− F is nondecreasing over [0, 1).
By the full support assumption, the conditional distributions P[· |θ > t] and P[· |θ > t] are
well defined for all t ∈ [0, 1), and the assumption that P dominates P in the hazard-rate order
is equivalent to the condition that, for each t ∈ [0, 1), P[· | θ > t] first-order stochastically
dominates P[· | θ > t] (Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, Section 1.B.1)). This, in turn,
implies that E[θ | θ > t] ≥ E[θ | θ > t] for any such t. It then follows from (12) that the
cutoff tc is smaller under P than under P, tc ≤ tc.
As a result, if the optimal IC persuasion mechanism when θ is distributed according
to P involves no consumption for some type, then neither does the optimal IC persuasion
mechanism when θ is distributed according to P. The intuition is that, for any cutoff
t ∈ [0, 1), the announcement that θ > t is more efficient at discouraging consumption
under P than under P. Hence it is credible to set the cutoff tc at a lower value under
P than under P, which allows the mechanism designer to neutralize a larger set of types
for which consumption would be harmful. Such types are more likely under P than under
P by first-order stochastic dominance. Finally, note that cases where (10) holds can be
discussed in a similar way as the value of ta does not depend on F and tc ≤ tc implies
max{th, tc} ≤ max{th, tc}. In fact, in line with Kolotilin (2015), we can derive the following
stronger result.
Corollary 1 If the distribution P dominates the distribution P in the increasing convex
order, that is,
EP[h(θ)] ≥ EP[h(θ)] for all nondecreasing and convex h, (14)
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then the probability of consuming is lower under P than under P.
Intuitively, two effects are reinforcing each other: it is more desirable to discourage
consumption under P than under P, and it is also an easier task for the mechanism designer,
because the optimal abstinence cutoff under P is a fortiori IC under P.
4.2 Changes in the Bias for the Present
We now turn to the comparative statics with respect to the severity of the decision maker’s
bias for the present, which is inversely related to β. We start with the basic observation
that the cutoff t∗ = max{th, tc} for θ above which abstinence is recommended is strictly
decreasing in β. Indeed, if (10) holds, then t∗ = th ≥ tc, and this directly follows from
(3)–(4); if (10) does not hold, then t∗ = tc > th, and this directly follows from (3) and (13).
Thus, if the optimal IC persuasion mechanism for a time-inconsistency parameter β involves
abstinence for a given value of θ, then so does the optimal IC persuasion mechanism for any
time-inconsistency parameter β > β. That is, a more severe bias for the present induces a
higher probability that consumption takes place, which corresponds to a tightening of the
target group receiving a credible warning to abstain. Notice from the above reasoning that
this intuitive property is satisfied regardless of whether the optimal IC persuasion mechanism
involves harmful consumption.
We now turn to the more subtle question of how a change in β affects the probability of
harmful consumption. We start with a closer examination of the condition (10) under which
the unconstrained-optimal mechanism pi∗γu associated to the cutoff t
h is IC. Using (3)–(4),
this condition can be written as
E
[
θ |θ > 1 + βδ
(1 + δ)βδ2C
]
≥ 1
βδ2C
. (15)
Because a time-consistent decision maker never engages into harmful consumption, a natural
guess is that the optimal IC persuasion mechanism involves no harmful consumption and,
hence, coincides with pi∗γu when the decision maker’s bias for the present is not too severe.
This intuition is confirmed by the observation that, because the distribution P has full
support, a sufficient condition for (15) to hold is that β be close enough to 1. This condition
turns out to be necessary when the distribution P satisfies a weakening of the monotone-
hazard-rate property. Specifically, assume that P has a continuous density f over [0, 1] that
is strictly positive over (0, 1). The appropriate regularity concept for distributions can then
be formulated as follows.
Definition 1 The distribution P is λ-regular for some λ ≥ −1 if
rλ(t) ≡ f(t)
[1− F (t)]1+λ (16)
is strictly increasing in t ∈ [0, 1).
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It is clear from (16) that a lower value of λ corresponds to a more stringent restriction
on the distribution P; thus (−1)-regularity means that the density f is strictly increasing,
0-regularity is the strict monotone-hazard-rate property, and 1-regularity is equivalent to
strict Myerson-regularity.10 The following result holds.
Corollary 2 If the distribution P is δ/(1 + δ)-regular, then pi∗γu is IC if and only if β ≥ βu,
where βu is the unique value of β ∈ (1/(δ2C), 1) that achieves equality in (15).
Thus, for a fixed δ/(1+δ)-regular distribution P, if the optimal IC persuasion mechanism
for a decision maker with time-inconsistency parameter β involves no harmful consumption,
then neither does the optimal IC persuasion mechanism for a decision maker with time-
inconsistency parameter β > β. That is, harmful consumption takes place if and only if the
decision maker’s bias for the present is severe enough. Some regularity of the distribution
of θ is necessary for obtaining such a clear-cut result. What is needed is a bound on the
derivative with respect to t of the upper-tail conditional expectation E[θ | θ > t], and this
is precisely what δ/(1 + δ)-regularity affords us. Remark C.1 in Appendix C provides an
example that violates this bound; the unconstrained-optimal persuasion mechanism is then
IC over two disjoint intervals of values for β. To avoid this somewhat counterinituitive
outcome, we henceforth assume that the distribution P is δ/(1 + δ)-regular.
Now, consider a value of β ∈ (1/(δ2C), βu) of β such that, therefore, harmful consumption
takes place under the optimal IC persuasion mechanism. Does a small increase in self-
control, that is, a small increase in β to some value β ∈ (β, βu), necessarily involve less
harmful consumption? There are two opposite effects at play here. On the one hand, from
the reasoning at the beginning of this section, there are values of θ such that the decision
maker would be trapped in harmful consumption under β but abstains under β; on the other
hand, according to (3)–(4), the lower bound th of the harmful-consumption interval (th, ta) is
lower under β than under β, because the decision maker attaches greater importance to the
harmful consequences of consumption if he has more self-control. The first effect tends to
reduce the optimal harmful-consumption trap (th, tc); the second, to increase it. Hence, any
statement about how harmful consumption varies with β under the optimal IC persuasion
mechanism is necessarily of a probabilistic nature. The following result is a first step in that
direction. It shows that, under a strengthening of the strict monotone-hazard-rate property,
harmful consumption is more likely to take place, the more severe the decision maker’s bias
for the present.
Corollary 3 If the distribution P satisfies the strict monotone-hazard-rate property and its
density f is such that, for all t and t′,
t > t′ implies f(t) >
1
1 + δ
f(t′), (17)
10See Ewerhart (2013) for this last equivalence and Schweizer and Szech (2019) for a systematic exploration
of this concept and relevant references to the literature.
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then the probability F (tc) − F (th) that harmful consumption takes place under the optimal
IC persuasion mechanism is strictly decreasing in β ∈ (1/(δ2C), βu).
Condition (17) is satisfied, for instance, if P is the uniform distribution. More generally,
it requires that the density f do not decrease too fast over [0, 1], so that the margin of risk
above which abstinence can be sustained, tc, remains in a probabilistic sense more important
than that above which consumption becomes harmful, th. However, condition (17) is not
satisfied, for instance, if P is a Beta(a, b) distribution with a, b > 1, which satisfies the
monotone-hazard-rate property (Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)), but not condition (17) as
then f(1) = 0. The following result shows that Corollary 3 does not extend to this case.
Specifically, whenever the decision maker’s bias for the present is already severe, a decrease
in this bias can actually lead to an increase in the probability of harmful consumption.
Corollary 4 If the distribution P satisfies the strict monotone-hazard-rate property and its
density f is nonincreasing in a left-neighborhood of t = 1 or strictly positive at t = 1, and if
f(1) <
1
2(1 + δ)
f
(
1 + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
, (18)
then the probability F (tc) − F (th) that harmful consumption takes place under the optimal
IC persuasion mechanism is strictly increasing in β in a right-neighborhood of β = 1/(δ2C).
The somewhat convoluted condition (18) can be intuitively interpreted as follows. If
initially β ≈ 1/(δ2C), then almost all types consume under the optimal IC persuasion
mechanism, that is, tc ≈ 1. If β increases by dβ, then the cutoff tc above which abstinence
can be sustained decreases by some amount dtc, so that a mass of types approximately
equal to f(1) dtc can be neutralized. At the same time, however, the cutoff th above which
consumption becomes harmful,
th =
E[θ |θ > tc] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
≈ 1 + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
,
decreases by an amount
dth ≈ dt
c
1 + δ
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]}
∣∣∣∣
t=1−
≥ dt
c
2(1 + δ)
under the weak conditions we impose on f .11 The mass of new types thus trapped in harmful
consumption is bounded below by 1/[2(1 + δ)]f(th) dtc, which exceeds the mass f(1) dtc of
neutralized types if condition (18) is satisfied. As a result, the probability of the harmful-
consumption trap (th, tc) locally increases in β. Notice that, because f is assumed to be
strictly positive over (0, 1), condition (18) is satisfied as soon as f(1) = 0.
11The intuition for the factor 12 is easy to grasp when f(1) > 0. Indeed, in that case, the distribution of θ
conditional on θ > t is approximately uniform when t is close to 1 as f is continuous, and hence a marginal
increase dt in t increases E [θ |θ > t] by approximately d[ 12 (t+ 1)] = 12 dt.
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5 Traffic-Light Nudges
Our analysis so far has relied on the assumption that there is a single decision maker with
known bias for the present or, if there is a population of decision makers, that they have
identical characteristics. Yet, in practice, not all individuals suffer from the same self-control
problems. On the one hand, people seem to differ in their overall self-control capacities
(Mischel (2014), Sutter, Kocher, Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, and Trautmann (2013)). Studies suggest
that the genetic profile plays a significant role for whether or not a person becomes addicted
to harmful behaviors (Davis and Loxton (2013)). Moreover, parenting seems to affect the
development of self-control in children (Finkenauer, Engels, and Baumeister (2005)). On
the other hand, the specific context can matter a lot. While smoking may be very tempting
for some consumers, others may find it easy to resist cigarettes, yet lose their self-control
when it comes to chocolate or candy. Also, self-control relies on other factors such as the
level of glucose available, so that a hungry individual may display comparatively little self-
control (Gailliot and Baumeister (2007)). This makes it important to assess which of the
insights from our basic model carry over to a more realistic scenario in which decision makers’
self-control levels are not known to the mechanism designer.
To address these issues we analyze optimal information nudges in a mixed population,
a share pL ∈ (0, 1) of which has low self-control and the remaining share pH has high self-
control, with corresponding time-inconsistency parameters 0 < βL < βH ≤ 1.12 The vNM
utility functions at dates 0 and 1 for type i = L,H are given by
Ui,0(x0, x1, θ) = x0(1− βiδ2θC) + x1βiδ(1− δ2θC), (19)
Ui,1(x0, x1, θ) = −x0βiδC + x1(1− βiδ2θC). (20)
The riskiness θ is assumed to be known to the mechanism designer and the same for each
decision maker, regardless of his level of self-control. Whether a specific decision maker is of
type L or H is unknown to the mechanism designer. Her goal is to maximize social welfare
at date 0. In the following, we focus on the case where each decision maker is offered the
same information structure, or joint mechanism, simultaneously targeting types L and H.
As a result, both types L and H are exposed to the same information, which is empirically
the case for tobacco, alcohol, or food warnings. For simplicity, we throughout assume that
P has a continuous density f over [0, 1] that is strictly positive over (0, 1) and, whenever
needed, that P is δ/(1 + δ)-regular.
It is clear from (19)–(20) that, for any mean posterior belief θˆ, type L consumes whenever
type H does. Therefore, we can focus on measurable direct joint persuasion mechanisms
x : Θ × Ω → {0, L, LH} issuing a recommendation for both types to abstain (0), for only
type L to consume (L), or for both types to consume (LH). In analogy with (5), the
probability of issuing recommendation j = 0, L, LH is
pij(θ) = λ[{ω ∈ Ω : x(θ, ω) = j}]. (21)
12In particular, we allow for the case βH = 1 where type H is not present-biased.
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As in Section 3.1, we can identify x with pi ≡ (pi0, piL, piLH). For each type i = L,H, we
denote by tai , t
h
i , t
c
i , and t
∗
i ≡ max{thi , tci} the relevant cutoffs defined in Sections 2–3 for the
individually optimally optimal mechanisms.
5.1 The No-Externality Case
We first determine when the two types exert no externality on each other, in the sense that
there is no relevant strategic interaction between their individually optimal mechanisms.
The latter can then be straightforwardly combined into a joint mechanism without affecting
incentives. For each type i = L,H, the optimal IC persuasion mechanism characterized
in Proposition 1 recommends abstinence if and only if θ > t∗i , and we have t
∗
H < t
∗
L. The
same outcome can be achieved in a mixed population if and only if the joint mechanism that
merges the two individually optimal mechanisms,13
(pi∗0, pi
∗
L, pi
∗
LH)(θ) ≡ (1{θ>t∗L}, 1{t∗H<θ≤t∗L}, 1{θ≤t∗H}) (22)
is IC. By inspection, this is the case if and only if, upon receiving recommendation L, type
H is willing to abstain, that is,
E[θ | t∗H < θ ≤ t∗L] ≥ taH . (23)
For βH close enough to 1, we have t
∗
H = t
h
H ≈ taH , and the incentive constraint (23) is
slack. By contrast, for βH close enough to βL, we have (t
∗
H , t
a
H) ≈ (t∗L, taL) and the incentive
constraint (23) is violated as t∗L < t
a
L. The following result formalizes the idea that the
two types exert no externality on each other if and only if βH is large enough relative to
βL, so that a single traffic-light nudge can replicate the outcome of the individually optimal
information nudges.
Proposition 2 If the distribution P is δ/(1 + δ)-regular, then, for each βL > 1/(δ
2C), there
exists a threshold βneH (βL) ∈ (βL, 1) such that the joint mechanism (22) is IC if and only
if βH ≥ βneH (βL). Moreover, the threshold βneH (βL) is strictly greater than βu and is strictly
increasing in βL.
Notice that, once again, the δ/(1 + δ)-regularity of the distribution P plays a key role
in deriving this intuitive result. Owing to its two-cutoff structure, the joint mechanism (22)
has a natural interpretation as a monotone traffic-light nudge, whereby the green-yellow-red
labels are used to signal low-intermediate-high risk. This makes this nudge especially simple
to understand, adding to its potential salience.
5.2 The Externality Case
We now analyze the case where (23) does not hold. Then the two individually optimal
13That is, the meet of the two individually optimal partitions of [0, 1].
21
mechanisms are not simultaneously implementable, so that the two types i = L,H exert an
externality on each other: at least one of them is bound to suffer from the existence of the
other. In line with (6)–(7), the joint mechanism (pi0, piL, piLH) is IC if and only if
E[θpi0(θ)]
E[pi0(θ)]
≥ taL, (24)
E[θpiL(θ)]
E[piL(θ)]
< taL, (25)
E[θpiL(θ)]
E[piL(θ)]
≥ taH , (26)
E[θpiLH(θ)]
E[piLH(θ)]
< taH . (27)
Letting ΠL ≡ piL + piLH and ΠH ≡ piLH be the respective probabilities of consuming for
type L and type H, the optimal-design problem can then, up to a multiplicative constant
(1 + δ)δ2C, be formulated as14
max
{∑
i=L,H
piβi{thi E[Πi(θ)]− E[θΠi(θ)]} : pi is IC
}
. (28)
For simplicity, we will first focus on the case where types L and H differ enough in their
levels of self-control, so that the intervals [thL, t
a
L] and [t
h
H , t
a
H ] do not overlap.
Assumption 2 taH < t
h
L.
Assumption 2 intuitively states that, conditional on the same posterior belief θˆ ∈ (taH , thL),
type L at date 0 favors a higher consumption rate than type H at date 1. By (3)–(4), this
is equivalent to
βH > β
no
H (βL) ≡
(1 + δ)βL
1 + βLδ
∈ (0, 1),
so that βH is large enough relative to βL. This lower bound is nevertheless consistent with
βH < β
ne
H (βL), in which case, according to Proposition 2, we are indeed in the externality
case. To see this, suppose, for instance, that βL ∈ [βu, 1), so that t∗L = thL by Corollary 2.
Then, for βH = β
no
H (βL), we have t
h
L = t
a
H > t
∗
H , and constraint (23) is violated as
E[θ|t∗H < θ ≤ t∗L] = E[θ|t∗H < θ ≤ taH ] < taH .
Hence, for βL ∈ [βu, 1) and βH = βnoH (βL), the joint mechanism (22) is not IC and the
threshold βneH (βL) in Proposition 2 satisfies β
ne
H (βL) > β
no
H (βL), as required.
Under Assumption 2, designing an IC joint mechanism is straightforward; for instance,
14Notice that the population shares pL and pH in (28) can also be interpreted as Pareto weights in the
mechanism designer’s social-welfare function. This is because we study a pure information-design problem,
with no aggregate resource constraint.
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the mechanism designer may sacrifice type H by letting him consume when θ ≤ taH , while
offering type L his individually optimal information nudge by setting
(pi0, piL, piLH)(θ) ≡ (1{θ>t∗L}, 1{taH<θ≤t∗L}, 1{θ≤taH}). (29)
Notice that the joint mechanism (29) is again a monotone traffic-light nudge, and that we
have used Assumption 2, which ensures that taH < t
h
L ≤ t∗L. However, as the expectation
of θ conditional on the yellow warning, that is, recommendation L being issued, is strictly
higher than taH , this joint mechanism can be improved by lowering the threshold below which
consumption for type H is recommended, while keeping the same threshold t∗L below which
consumption for type L is recommended. We will see in Corollary 5 that such a modification
can be optimal provided the share of type L in the population is high enough. Meanwhile,
the upshot of this discussion is that there are gains from pooling intermediate values of θ
into a yellow warning label. Indeed, the central result of this section more generally states
that, under Assumption 2, a two-cutoff joint mechanism is optimal.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 2, there exist two cutoffs 0 < t∗∗LH ≤ t∗∗L ≤ 1 such that
(pi∗∗0 , pi
∗∗
L , pi
∗∗
LH)(θ) ≡ (1{θ>t∗∗L }, 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗∗L }, 1{θ≤t∗∗LH}) (30)
is an optimal IC joint mechanism.
When t∗∗LH < t
∗∗
L , the optimal IC joint mechanism can be implemented by a three-label
monotone traffic-light nudge; as we will see in Lemma 3 below, this inequality is always
satisfied under Assumption 2. High-risk consumers with θ > t∗∗L receive a warning to abstain,
regardless of their level of self-control. This signal corresponds to a red warning label; all
consumers will find their riskiness high enough to abstain. For intermediate-risk consumers
with t∗∗LH < θ ≤ t∗∗L , those with high self-control receive a warning to abstain, while those
with low self-control receive a recommendation to consume. This signal corresponds to a
yellow warning label; consumers with high self-control will find their riskiness high enough
to abstain, while consumers with low self-control will consume. Low-risk consumers with
θ ≤ t∗∗LH receive a recommendation to consume, regardless of their level of self-control. This
signal corresponds to a green label; all consumers will find their riskiness low enough to
consume. Such a monotone traffic-light nudge can thus optimally reach consumers with
low self-control without sacrificing those with high self-control; it also has an easy-to-grasp
connotation.15 Koenigstorfer, Groeppel-Klein, and Kamm (2014) confirm this prediction in
an empirical study, comparing consumers with high and low levels of self-control.
Proposition 3 generalizes the optimality of cutoff mechanisms to the more realistic case
of heterogenous β’s. As in the proof of Lemma 2 for the homogeneous case, the intuition is
15A red label may be an especially salient warning. The empirical literature is mixed on whether traffic-
light labels render the provision of information more effective or not, see VanEpps, Downs, and Loewenstein
(2016) for a discussion. Yet, of course, this aspect is beyond the analysis of this paper.
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based on a comparison of all mechanisms that assign the same probabilities to the different
recommendations. As before, using a cutoff t∗∗LH to distinguish between green and yellow
is good for both efficiency and incentive-compatibility purposes. For the optimal decision
whether to display yellow or red there arises, however, a novel tradeoff. On the one hand,
pooling the highest risk types into red rather than yellow is good for efficiency purposes
as this label induces consumers to abstain regardless of their level of self-control. On the
other hand, pooling the highest risk types into yellow rather than red is good for incentive-
compatibility purposes as this relaxes the key incentive constraint (26). In Appendix C,
we prove that, under Assumption 2, the first effect dominates, giving rise to a monotone
traffic-light nudge.
Several studies document that traffic-light labels work. For example, they are used to
promote healthy food choices, see Hawley, Roberto, Bragg, Liu, Schwartz, and Brownell
(2013), Thorndike, Riis, Sonnenberg, and Levy (2014), and the references therein. Relying
on nationally representative data from six European nations, Reisch and Sunstein (2016)
demonstrate that there is also broad support in the population for the introduction of such
information nudges in order to support healthy eating habits and fight obesity. Proposition
3 suggests that heterogeneity in levels of self-control across consumers is a possible rationale
for monotone traffic-light nudges that use green-yellow-red labels as an ordered signal of a
potentially harmful good’s riskiness.
Our next result explicitly characterizes the optimal cutoffs (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) that correspond to
the green-yellow and yellow-red boundaries, respectively.
Lemma 3 Suppose that (23) does not hold, so that the individually optimal mechanisms
with cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable, and let tˆLH(t
∗
L) be implicitly
defined by
E[θ | tˆLH(t∗L) < θ ≤ t∗L] = taH . (31)
Then the optimal cutoffs (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) in (30) satisfy t
∗∗
LH < t
∗∗
L and are given by
1. (tˆLH(t
∗
L), t
∗
L) if and only if
pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
≤ t
a
H − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
, (32)
2. (t∗H , 1) if and only if
pHβH
pLβL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
≥ t
a
H − t∗H
1− taH
, (33)
3. the unique solution to
E[θ | t∗∗LH < θ ≤ t∗∗L ] = taH and
pHβH
pLβL
t∗∗LH − thH
t∗∗L − thL
=
taH − t∗∗LH
t∗∗L − taH
(34)
otherwise.
24
The characterization in Case 3 exactly reflects the tradeoff faced by the mechanism
designer when she attempts to simultaneously persuade both types. Pooling marginally more
risks into yellow rather than into green by decreasing t∗∗LH comes at a benefit proportional to
pHβH(t
∗∗
LH − thH) due to higher abstinence of type H. Yet there is also the marginal cost of
tightening type H’s incentive constraint (26) from below, which is proportional to taH − t∗∗LH .
Similarly, pooling marginally more risks into red rather than into yellow by decreasing t∗∗L
comes at a benefit proportional to pLβL(t
∗∗
L − thL) due to higher abstinence of type L. Yet
there is also the marginal cost of tightening type H’s incentive constraint (26) from above,
which is proportional to t∗∗L − taH . In an interior solution, we obtain the standard result
that the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal cost ratio, where the cost is here
measured in terms of tightening type H’s incentive constraint. Case 1 corresponds to a corner
solution in which the marginal rate of substitution of decreases in tLH for decreases in tL is
everywhere less than the marginal cost ratio, so that type L faces his individually optimal
mechanism with cutoff t∗L, and is thus privileged to the detriment of type H. Similarly,
Case 2 corresponds to a corner solution in which the designer entirely gives up on inducing
abstinence for type L in order to achieve the maximum possible abstinence probability for
type H, who is thus privileged to the detriment of type L.
The cutoff characterization conditions (32)–(33) affords us straightforward comparative
statics with respect to the population share of type H, which determines which of Cases 1–3
in Lemma 3 arises.
Corollary 5 Suppose that (23) does not hold, so that the individually optimal mechanisms
with cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable. Then there exist thresholds
0 ≤ p < p ≤ 1 such that
1. for pH ∈ [0, p], the optimal IC joint mechanism implements the individually optimal
cutoff t∗L for type L and the cutoff for type H is determined by (31),
2. for pH ∈ [p, 1], the optimal IC joint mechanism implements the individually optimal
cutoff t∗H for type H, while type L always consumes,
3. for pH ∈ (p, p), the optimal IC joint mechanism implements the interior solution to
(34). Consumption of type H is strictly decreasing in pH , while consumption of type L
is strictly increasing in pH .
Moreover, p = 0 if and only if the individually unconstrained-optimal mechanism for type
L is IC in the sense of Proposition 1, and similarly p = 1 if and only if the individually
unconstrained-optimal mechanism for type L is IC in the sense of Proposition 1.
We conclude this section with a short discussion of what can happen when Assumption
2 does not hold. In that case, pooling the highest risk types into yellow rather than red may
prove so efficient at relaxing incentive constraint (26) that it becomes optimal to screen type
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L and type H when they have high riskiness. In that case, a nonmonotone traffic-light nudge
may be optimal, but we should stress that such a nudge loses much of the intuitive appeal
of those we have encountered so far, as the yellow warning label now pools intermediate and
extreme values of θ. Alternatively, if the two types are very similar, a pooling outcome can
emerge, in which both types face the individually optimal information nudge for type L.
Proposition 4 In general, there exist three cutoffs 0 < t∗∗LH ≤ t∗∗L ≤ t∗∗L ≤ 1 such that
(pi∗∗0 , pi
∗∗
L , pi
∗∗
LH)(θ) ≡ (1{t∗∗L <θ≤t∗∗L }, 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗∗L } + 1{θ>t∗∗L }, 1{θ≤t∗∗LH}) (35)
is an optimal IC joint mechanism.
6 Alternative Objective Functions
So far, we have focused on benevolent persuasion mechanisms that maximize the decision
maker’s date-0 utility. We now return to the basic setting of Section 3 and contrast this
optimal liberal policy with the optimal policies of other interest groups. For instance, a
lobbyist might have an interest in implementing an information nudge that convinces as
many people as possible to consume. By contrast, a health authority focusing on the long-
run health effects of harmful consumption and ignoring its short-term enjoyable aspects might
want to use an information nudge that deters as many people as possible from consuming.
Motivated by these two polar cases, we consider the problems of finding IC mechanisms that
maximize or minimize the expected probability of consuming, solving, respectively,16
max{E[pi(θ)] : pi is IC}, (36)
min{E[pi(θ)] : pi is IC}. (37)
By Lemma 2, if some mechanism pi such that E[pi(θ)] = γ is IC, then so is the cutoff
mechanism pi∗γ. We can thus again focus on cutoff mechanisms. The maximizer in (36)
wants to choose the largest IC value of γ, while the minimizer in (37) wants to choose
the smallest one. Hence a lobbyist wants the target group such that the warning loses its
impact to be as large as possible; by contrast, a health authority wants to send a convincing
warning and therefore needs to tighten the target group. If the bias for the present is severe
enough, this may imply that many types who would rather abstain cannot be warned. In
the following, we study how this sacrifice needs to be done.
Observe that, depending on the parameters of the model, one of the two problems (36)–
(37) is always trivial. Indeed, if E[θ] < ta, then the decision maker consumes absent further
information. The uninformative persuasion mechanism associated to γ = 1 thus solves (36)
in this case, so that, from a lobbyist’s perspective, there is no need for an information nudge.
16Notice that this formulation implicitly assumes that θ is unobserved by the mechanism designer. One
possible interpretation is that θ corresponds to a consumer’s individual disposition for being harmed by
consumption which is independently distributed across consumers.
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Conversely, if E[θ] ≥ ta, then the decision maker abstains absent further information. The
uninformative persuasion mechanism associated to γ = 0 thus solves (37) in this case, so that,
from a health authority’s perspective, there is no need for an information nudge. However,
a lobbyist would like to spread information, in order to seduce low-risk types into harmful
consumption, as we analyze in detail below.
Overall, depending on the value of β, the same nudge either minimizes or maximizes the
probability of consumption. Specifically, notice that there always exists βm ∈ (0, 1) such that
ta(βm) = E[θ]. The mechanism that minimizes the probability of consumption for β ≥ βm
maximizes it for β < βm. Therefore, a misspecification of β can lead to an information nudge
with consequences opposite to those initially intended: a miscalibrated health authority may
think that a lobbyist’s policy is ideal from a health perspective when, indeed, exactly the
opposite is the case. A health authority must thus be careful not to overestimate β, that is,
not to underestimate consumers’ bias for the present. The converse holds for a lobbyist who
must be careful not to overestimate consumers’ bias for the present.
There remains to study (36) for E[θ] ≥ ta and (37) for E[θ] < ta. Consider first the
latter problem. For pi ≡ pi∗γ, the left-hand side of (6) increases strictly and continuously in γ
from θ to E[θ], while the left-hand side of (7) strictly and continuously increases in γ from
E[θ] to θ. By Assumption 1, θ < ta < θ. Thus (6) is satisfied for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. To satisfy
(7), γ has to be chosen sufficiently large. By continuity, there exists a single value γmin of γ
in (0, 1) such that (7) holds with equality,
E[θ[1− pi∗γmin(θ)]]
E[1− pi∗
γmin
(θ)]
= ta. (38)
Thus γmin is the smallest value of γ that is consistent with an IC persuasion mechanism. As
a result, pi∗γmin solves (37). A key observation that follows from (11) and (38) is that γ
min
coincides with γc, the probability that consumption takes place in the consumer-optimal
IC mechanism when the unconstrained-optimal mechanism pi∗γu is not IC. Hence we can
reinterpret the mechanism characterized in Proposition 1 as follows: if possible, implement
the unconstrained-optimal mechanism; otherwise, implement the mechanism that minimizes
the probability of consuming. The decision maker’s interests are, therefore, aligned with
those of a health authority aiming at minimizing the probability of consuming if his bias for
the present is severe enough.
Figure 3 illustrates the relation between the optimal liberal policy and the consumption-
minimizing policy as functions of the time-inconsistency parameter β. Types are distributed
with quadratic density f(θ) = 12(θ − 1
2
)2, and we set δ = 0.9 and C = 1.5. As the figure
demonstrates, for β  βu ≈ 0.867, the proportion of consumers who abstain under the
consumption-minimizing policy (dotted line) is much higher than the proportion of those
who abstain under the optimal liberal policy (dashed line). In this case, the optimal liberal
policy coincides with the unconstrained-optimal policy. When the bias for the present is more
severe, that is, for β between 1/(δ2C) ≈ 0.8230 and βu, stronger warnings are necessary in
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Figure 3: Probabilities of abstinence and of harmful consumption as functions of β.
order to successfully deter consumption. The abstinence probabilities of the optimal liberal
policy and of the consumption-minimizing policy coincide (solid black line). As β further
decreases towards 1/(δ2C), the probability of harmful consumption (solid grey line) increases
substantially because the target group receiving a credible warning needs to be increasingly
tightened. For β near 1/(δ2C), more than 20% of consumers are in the harmful-consumption
trap, and only a tiny fraction of types can be convinced to abstain under such a severe bias
for the present.
Let us now turn to the lobbyist’s perspective. Problem (36) for E[θ] ≥ ta is almost the
mirror image of problem (37) for E[θ] < ta. In this case, (7) trivially holds, while γ has
to be chosen sufficiently small to ensure that (6) is satisfied for pi∗γ. We can characterize a
threshold γmax via equality in (6),
E[θpi∗γmax(θ)]
E[pi∗γmax(θ)]
= ta. (39)
However, due the fact that (6) is a strict inequality constraint, the mechanism pi∗γmax is not IC
if the decision maker’s behavior is described by the efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the intrapersonal game characterized in Lemma 1. As a result, problem (36) does not possess
a solution. Instead, the best the lobbyist can do is to implement a cutoff mechanism with
γ = γmax − ε for some small ε > 0. Alternatively, we may assume that, in the intrapersonal
game, self-0 and self-1 coordinate on the least efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which
they both consume for a mean posterior belief θˆ = ta. In that case, it is possible to implement
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a cutoff mechanism with γ = γmax which maximizes the expected probability of consuming.
This mechanism cynically takes advantage of the decision maker’s self-control problem by
issuing the recommendation to consume in such a way that, upon receiving it, the decision
maker ends up, in terms of his date-0 utility, at the lowest point of the harmful-consumption
interval (th, ta). In analogy with (13), the corresponding cutoff for θ can be characterized as
follows. If the equation
E[θ |θ ≤ t] = ta (40)
has a solution t = tmax, then γmax = F (tmax) and pi∗γmax = 1{θ≤tmax}. For now familiar reasons,
if P has atoms, such a solution need not exist. In that case, the optimal mechanism may
necessitate randomization to achieve an equality in constraint (6), as required by (39). In
analogy with (13), let
tmax ≡ inf {t ∈ [ta, 1] : E[θ |θ ≤ t] ≥ ta}, (41)
which is well defined by Assumption 1 as E[θ] ≥ ta. Because E[θ |θ ≤ t] is right-continuous
in t, it follows that either (40) is satisfied by tmax or (40) has no solution. In the latter case,
we have P[θ = tmax] > 0, E[θ | θ < tmax] ≤ ta, and E[θ | θ ≤ tmax] > ta. If the second
of these inequalities is an equality, then it is optimal to recommend to abstain for sure at
θ = tmax and pi∗γmax = 1{θ<tmax}. If this inequality is strict, recommending to abstain for
sure at θ = tmax would make the recommendation to abstain inefficiently alarming, thereby
preventing the lobbyist from inducing consumption with probability γmax, while, according
to the third inequality, recommending to consume for sure at θ = tmax would undermine the
credibility of the mechanism. Randomization at the atom tmax is then required, in line with
Lemma A.1 in Appendix A. In any case, it is easy to check from (41) that P[(ta, tmax]] > 0,
so that, if E[θ] > ta, there are types who are trapped in harmful consumption who, had
they not been exposed to further information, would have abstained. This shows how a
present-biased decision maker can fall prey to an opportunistic information design.
For example, nutritionists argue that by issuing warnings for specific high-risk groups
only, many foods may still feel appropriate for people of lower risk type.17 These people
then continue to consume not so healthy foods that they may otherwise have started to
call into question. Examples include an abundant consumption of fatty cheese and meat
products which can possibly deteriorate health, and should better be replaced by healthier
choices such as vegetables and fruits. This is likely not only true for people with specifically
high risk of stroke or heart disease, but for everybody.18 Thus the release of a warning
to a high-risk group can at the same time function as a justification to continue harmful
consumption for those of lower risk, belonging to the nontarget group. Policy makers need
to be aware of this problem which arises because of present-biased preferences.
17Compare, for instance, Fuhrman (2011).
18See, for instance, advice by the Mayo Clinic for a heart-healthy diet, www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/heart-disease/in-depth/heart-healthy-diet/art-20047702 as well as dietary recommendations
by the Australian Heart Foundation to those who had to suffer from a heart attack, www.heart
foundation.org.au/after-my-heart-attack/heart-attack-recovery/diets-and-meals.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the optimal design of credible information nudges for populations of
heterogeneous consumers with present-biased preferences. We found that the implementation
of optimal information structures is easy in the sense that they are of cutoff type: an optimal
information nudge should focus on a specific target group, and present a signal that is credible
to this target group.
Yet the design of optimal information nudges is challenging in the sense that the bias for
the present plays a crucial role: depending on how drastic it is, the target group needs to be
adapted. Populations with a severe bias need a much more drastic signal in order to avoid
harmful consumption. From a liberal designer’s perspective, this means that fewer consumers
can receive a credible signal to abstain. If consumers have different biases for the present, the
traffic-light structure of the optimal nudge addresses this problem by releasing, in addition
to the strong, red warning, a specifically milder, yellow warning. Thus heterogeneity in
self-control is a rationale for the traffic-light nudges we observe in practice.
A lobbyist aiming at high consumption rates will provide an information nudge of no
impact, or, worse, one that tempts people into consumption who would otherwise abstain. If
policy makers overlook or underestimate consumers’ self-control problems, such a nudge may
seem health-concerned when in fact exactly the opposite is the case. It is thus a necessity for
policy makers to figure in effects of self-control when it comes to the design and evaluation
of powerful information nudges to limit harmful consumption.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Optimal Mechanisms
As discussed in the main text, Proposition 1 can be derived from more general results in the
Bayesian-persuasion literature. For the reader’s convenience, this appendix provides an elementary
and self-contained derivation of optimal IC persuasion mechanisms in the setting of Section 3.
Moreover, we illustrate how such mechanisms can be constructed using a concavification argument
as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) when θ is binary.
The first step of our characterization consists in showing that there is no loss of generality
in focusing on cutoff mechanisms. To see why, we first restrict attention to mechanisms pi that
recommend consuming with some given probability γ, that is, E[pi(θ)] = γ. Let us momentarily
abstract from incentive considerations and consider, among these mechanisms, one that maximizes
the objective in (8) or, equivalently, that solves
min{E[θpi(θ)] : E[pi(θ)] = γ}. (A.1)
That is, subject to the constraint that consuming be recommended with probability γ, we want to
find a mechanism that minimizes the expected harm from consumption. Given this objective, it is
optimal to concentrate the mass γ of consumption recommendations on small values of θ. If the
distribution P is nonatomic, then a solution to (A.1) takes the value 1 in an interval starting at
zero until enough probability mass has accumulated, that is, until the γ-quantile of F is reached,
after which it takes the value 0. If P has atoms, then the γ-quantile of F may well lie within
an atom; in that case, a solution to (A.1) may necessitate randomization, but only at this atom.
Formally, the following result holds.
Lemma A.1 The unique solution to (A.1) is, up to a P-null set, the cutoff mechanism pi∗γ.
Returning to incentive considerations, observe that if some mechanism pi such that E[pi(θ)] = γ
is IC, then so is pi∗γ . This is clear if γ ∈ (0, 1), for pi∗γ minimizes the left-hand side of (6) and
maximizes the left-hand side of (7) among the mechanisms pi such that E[pi(θ)] = γ. This is also
trivially true if γ ∈ {0, 1}, for then pi = pi∗γ up to a P-null set. Because, by Lemma A.1, pi∗γ uniquely
minimizes the expected harm from consumption among the mechanisms pi such that E[pi(θ)] = γ,
this shows that we can confine ourselves to the class of IC cutoff mechanisms.
The cutoff mechanism pi∗γ is IC if
E[θpi∗γ(θ)]
E[pi∗γ(θ)]
< ta, (A.2)
E[θ[1− pi∗γ(θ)]]
E[1− pi∗γ(θ)]
≥ ta, (A.3)
with the same convention as for (6)–(7) if γ ∈ {0, 1}, that is, empty constraints are considered as
satisfied. The optimal-design problem (8) can then be restated as
max{thE[pi∗γ(θ)]−E[θpi∗γ(θ)] : γ satisfies (A.2)–(A.3)}. (A.4)
We now derive an explicit characterization of optimal persuasion mechanisms, proving in particular
that there always exists a solution to (A.4).
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To characterize the solution to (A.4), let us once again abstract from incentive considerations
and consider, among all values of γ, the largest one that maximizes the objective in (A.4). The
corresponding unconstrained-optimal mechanism is the indicator function of the range where the
net benefit th − θ from consuming is nonnegative,
pi∗γu(θ) = 1{θ≤th},
so that γu = F (th) > 0. In particular, pi∗γu does not involve randomization.19
If pi∗γu satisfies (A.2)–(A.3), then it is also IC and, therefore, solves the initial optimal-design
problem (8). Under Assumption 1, this amounts to
E[θ |θ ≤ th] < ta, (A.5)
E[θ |θ > th] ≥ ta. (A.6)
Because th < ta, (A.5) is automatically satisfied. Hence the following result holds.
Lemma A.2 If (A.6) holds, then the optimal IC persuasion mechanism is pi∗γu up to a P-null set.
If (A.6) does not hold, then pi∗γu is no longer IC. This implies that harmful consumption can no
longer be avoided for all values of θ > th or, equivalently, that the optimal IC persuasion mechanism
recommends to consume with probability γc > γu. Because the net benefit th − θ from consuming
only switches sign once, the objective in (A.4) is first nondecreasing and then nonincreasing in γ.
It is then optimal to have γc as close as possible to γu, while preserving (A.3). The following result
thus holds.
Lemma A.3 If (A.6) does not hold, then the optimal IC persuasion mechanism is pi∗γc up to a
P-null set, where (11) implicitly defines the probability γc of consuming.
The proof of Lemma A.3 relies on two observations. First, when γ increases from 0 to 1, the left-
hand side of (A.3) strictly and continuously increases from E[θ] to θ. Now, E[θ] < E[θ |θ > th] < ta
if (A.6) does not hold, while θ > ta under Assumption 1. Thus there exists a single value of γ
such that the incentive constraint (A.3) following the recommendation to abstain is just satisfied
as an equality, that is, (11) holds. Second, the resulting cutoff mechanism pi∗γc also satisfies the
incentive constraint (A.2) following the recommendation to consume, for the corresponding mean
posterior belief about θ is below E[θ] and thus, a fortiori, below ta if (A.6) does not hold. Thus
our candidate optimal mechanism pi∗γc is IC, which achieves the characterization.
The Binary Case We now illustrate our findings in the case where θ can only take two values
θ and θ such that th < θ < ta and θ > ta.20 Hence, according to Lemma 1, the decision maker
consumes at both dates and obtains a negative payoff if θ is revealed to be θ, and abstains at
both dates and obtains a zero payoff if θ is revealed to be θ. To characterize the optimal IC
persuasion mechanism in this binary case, we can use Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (2011) standard
19If P [θ = th] > 0, there exists a continuum of unconstrained-optimal cutoff mechanisms indexed by
γ ∈ [F (th−), F (th)]. We choose the largest one because it is most likely to satisfy constraint (A.3).
20The first of these two inequalities is not consistent with the first half of Assumption 1. However, a careful
reading of the above derivation reveals that we only used the latter when discussing the unconstrained-optimal
mechanism, which is not required in the present binary case.
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concavification argument, working directly in terms of the prior belief p = P[θ = θ] as in Aumann
and Maschler (1995). Letting
pa ≡ θ − t
a
θ − θ ∈ (0, 1), (A.7)
the date-0 expected payoff of the decision maker is, up to a multiplicative constant (1 + δ)/ta,
V0(p) ≡ [th − pθ − (1− p)θ]1{p>pa},
which is negative for p > pa; notice the downward discontinuity of V0 at p
a, which reflects the
discontinuity in the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff at θˆ = paθ + (1 − pa)θ = ta. The
concavification cav V0 of V0 coincides with V0 over [0, p
a], where it is flat and equal to zero, and is
affine and decreasing over (pa, 1]. Figure A.1 below illustrates this construction.
-
p1pa
r
6
V0, cav V0
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Figure A.1: Concavifying the decision maker’s date-0 equilibrium payoff.
Two regimes then emerge. When p ≤ pa, that is, when the decision maker would abstain absent
further information, there is no reason to disclose such information, as doing so can never benefit
the decision maker and may actually hurt him. The unconstrained-optimal mechanism is IC and
prescribes that no information be disclosed to the decision maker, who thus does not engage in
harmful consumption.
By contrast, when p > pa, that is, when the decision maker would consume absent further
information, the optimal IC mechanism involves randomization and, with positive probability,
harmful consumption. Specifically, if θ = θ, then the recommendation to consume is issued with
probability pi∗γc(θ) = 0, while, if θ = θ, then the recommendation to consume is issued with
probability pi∗γc(θ) ∈ (0, 1), where
p[1− pi∗γc(θ)]
p[1− pi∗γc(θ)] + 1− p
= pa. (A.8)
Therefore, the recommendation to consume reveals that θ = θ, which triggers consumption as
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θ < ta. By contrast, the recommendation to abstain does not fully disclose θ to the decision
maker: according to (A.7)–(A.8), the decision maker’s mean posterior belief about θ following the
recommendation to abstain is equal to ta, that is, the minimum level consistent with him abstaining.
In this way, this recommendation is used in the most efficient way, while remaining credible.
It is interesting to point out how the optimal IC persuasion mechanism responds to an increase
in the severity of the decision maker’s bias for the present, that is, a decrease in β. First, the cutoff
ta increases, reflecting that the decision maker engages in potentially harmful consumption for a
larger value of the mean posterior belief θˆ. According to (A.7), this, in turn, decreases the cutoff
belief pa that θ = θ below which the decision maker abstains absent any further information: he
must thus be more pessimistic to abstain. Finally, according to (A.8), if p > pa, the probability of
issuing the recommendation to abstain conditional on θ = θ must decrease to preserve its credibility.
Overall, harmful consumption is more likely to take place, the more severe the decision maker’s
bias for the present.
Appendix B: Sampling versus Information Design
It is instructive to compare our results to those obtained by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), who
consider the case where the decision maker can sample costless information about θ by throwing
i.i.d. biased coins with success probability θ before making his consumption decisions. We assume
that P is nonatomic, with full support over [0, 1], and that (10) does not hold, so that the optimal
IC mechanism pi∗γc involves harmful consumption and recommends to abstain when θ > tc, where
tc is defined by (13).
If the decision maker can sample, he never finds it optimal to consume without the benefit
of full information about θ. Indeed, because, at any stage of the sampling process, his posterior
beliefs have full support over [0, 1] and thus put a strictly positive weight on the abstinence interval
[ta, 1], he is strictly better off, before engaging in consumption, acquiring information that will
either confirm his consumption decision or lead him to rationally abstain. By contrast, in the
present model, the posterior belief of the decision maker following a recommendation to consume
is P[· |θ ≤ tc], the support of which does not intersect [ta, 1] as tc < ta; the decision maker is then
indifferent about acquiring additional information about θ.
A common feature of the two models is that abstinence can be only sustained for mean posterior
beliefs θˆ ≥ ta; this inequality is typically strict when the decision maker samples information
himself, while it is an equality in the optimal IC persuasion mechanism. This, in turn, reflects
that ignorance is achieved in different ways in the two models. In the sampling model, when the
decision maker has a current posterior belief with mean θˆ slightly above ta and with low variance, it
is typically optimal for him to stop sampling. Indeed, conditional on θ < ta, it is likely that θ will be
close to ta; there is then a nonnegligible risk that the decision maker will eventually learn this and
be trapped in harmful consumption. By contrast, in the present information-design model, types
θ < ta close to ta are completely neutralized as they are pooled with types θ ≥ ta. Thus, although
the rationale for strategic ignorance is the same in the two models, and although the decision maker’s
beliefs follow a martingale in both cases, sampling creates an additional risk by making pieces of
information available only sequentially; this creates a further motive for information avoidance,
inducing the decision maker to be more cautious in his collection of information. By contrast, the
release of signals in the information-design model is optimized by a mechanism designer, contingent
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on the value of θ; thus everything happens as if all sampling was done ex ante and different pieces
of information were batched together to be optimally presented to the decision maker.
Overall, no decision-maker type should better avoid the optimized information nudge. The
only “shortcoming” of the optimal nudge may be that the target group is smaller than some types
may wish for. However, a tightening of the target group is necessary to preserve credibility and
efficiently mitigate self-control problems.
Appendix C: Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Corollary 1. We focus with no loss of generality on the case where (10) does not hold
under both P and P. We need to show that that F (tc) ≥ F (tc). For this we show that the unique
tˆ defined by F (tc) = F (tˆ) satisfies tˆ ≥ tc. We have∫ 1
tˆ
(θ − ta) P(dθ) =
∫ 1
F−1(F (tc))
(θ − ta) P(dθ)
=
∫ 1
F (tc)
[F−1(p)− ta] dp
≥
∫ 1
F (tc)
[F−1(p)− ta] dp
=
∫ 1
tc
(θ − ta) P(dθ)
= 0
=
∫ 1
tc
(θ − ta) P(dθ),
where the inequality follows from Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, Section 4.A.1) and the last two
equalities follow from (12). If tˆ ≥ ta, then a fortiori tˆ > tc. Otherwise, max{tc, tˆ} < ta implies that
θ − ta < 0 for θ between tc and tˆ, so that tˆ ≥ tc from the above inequality. Hence the result. 
Proof of Corollary 2. For future reference, we more generally show the result for any left-
truncation Pb ≡ P[· |θ ≤ b] of P, with cumulative distribution function Fb and probability density
function fb over the support [0, b], where 1/(δ
2C) < b ≤ 1. Corollary 2 corresponds to the special
case b = 1. An important observation is that λ-regularity is preserved by left-truncation.
Lemma C.1 Suppose that, for some λ ≥ −1, the distribution P is λ-regular. Then, for each
b ∈ (0, 1), the distribution Pb is λ-regular.
Proof. For each t ∈ [0, b), we have
rb,λ(t) ≡ fb(t)
[1− Fb(t)]1+λ ∝
f(t)
[F (b)− F (t)]1+λ = rλ(t)
[
1− F (t)
F (b)− F (t)
]1+λ
, (C.1)
so that rb,λ(t) is the product of two strictly positive and strictly increasing functions of t. The
result follows. 
Now, fix some b ∈ (1/(δ2C), 1) and, for each β ∈ (1/(bδ2C), 1), define
φb(β) ≡ Eb
[
θ |θ > 1 + βδ
(1 + δ)βδ2C
]
− 1
βδ2C
. (C.2)
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We show that there exists a unique solution βub to φb(β) = 0 and that φb(β) ≥ 0 if and only if
β ≥ βub . This, in particular, implies Corollary 2, with βu ≡ βu1 . Because f is continuous, so is
φb. Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, we only need to check that φb(1/(bδ
2C)) < 0, that
φb(1) > 0, and that φb is strictly increasing. As for the first two statements, we have
φb
(
1
bδ2C
)
= Eb
[
θ |θ > 1 + bδC
(1 + δ)δC
]
− b and φb(1) = Eb
[
θ |θ > 1
δ2C
]
− 1
δ2C
,
and the result follows from bδ2C > 1 and the fact that Pb has full support over [0, b]. As for
the third statement, notice that, letting ξ ≡ 1/(βδ2C) and changing variables accordingly, it is
equivalent to the claim that
Eb
[
θ |θ > ξ + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
]
− ξ
is strictly decreasing in ξ ∈ (1/(δ2C), b). That this is the case if P is δ/(1 + δ)-regular is a
consequence of the following lemma, which generalizes the standard observation that the mean
residual life is strictly decreasing in the age when P satisfies the monotone-hazard-rate property
(see, for instance, Bryson and Siddiqui (1969)).
Lemma C.2 Suppose that, for some λ ∈ (−1, 1), the distribution P is λ-regular. Then
d
dt
{Eb [θ |θ > t]} < 1
1− λ (C.3)
for all b ∈ (0, 1) and t ∈ [0, b).
Proof. By Lemma C.1, Pb is λ-regular over its support [0, b], so that rb,λ as defined by (C.1) is
strictly increasing. For each t ∈ [0, b),
d
dt
{Eb [θ |θ > t]} = fb(t)
1− Fb(t) {Eb [θ |θ > t]− t}. (C.4)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (C.3) does not hold for some t ∈ [0, b). Then, according to
(C.4) and to the strict monotonicity of rb,λ, we have
fb(θ)
[1− Fb(θ)]1+λ >
[1− Fb(t)]−λ
(1− λ){Eb [θ |θ > t]− t}
for all θ ∈ (t, b) and, therefore,∫ b
t
[1− Fb(θ)]−λfb(θ) dθ > [1− Fb(t)]
−λ
(1− λ){Eb [θ |θ > t]− t}
∫ b
t
[1− Fb(θ)] dθ. (C.5)
As the integral on the left-hand side of (C.5) equals [1− Fb(t)]1−λ/(1− λ), rearranging yields
Eb [θ |θ > t]− t > 1
1− Fb(t)
∫ b
t
[1− Fb(θ)] dθ. (C.6)
Integrating by parts, we have∫ b
t
[1− Fb(θ)] dθ =
∫ b
t
θfb(θ) dθ − t[1− Fb(t)].
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Figure C.1: ta(β) (in gray), E[θ |θ > th(β)] (in black) and th(β) (dashed) under (C.7).
Substituting in (C.6) and rearranging then yields
Eb [θ |θ > t]− t > Eb [θ |θ > t]− t,
a contradiction. The result follows. 
By Lemma C.2, taking λ = δ/(1 + δ) so that δ = λ/(1− λ) then implies
d
dξ
{
Eb
[
θ |θ > ξ + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
]
− ξ
}
< 0
for all ξ ∈ (1/(δ2C), b). Hence the result. 
Remark C.1. Figure C.1 shows that some regularity of P is necessary for a clear-cut result like
Corollary 2. The figure shows ta(β), E[θ | θ > th(β)] and th(β) for C = 2 and δ = 1, when P is a
mixture of three uniform distributions with density
f(t) = 0.1 · 1{t∈[0,1]} + 0.45 · 1{t∈[0.69,0.71]} + 0.45 · 1{t∈[0.94,0.96]}. (C.7)
Most of the probability mass is thus concentrated in two small intervals around 0.7 and 0.95.
As β increases, th(β) decreases. Now, as th(β) passes through the interval [0.69, 0.71], which
carries almost half the probability mass, we observe a steep drop in E[θ | θ > th(β)] from the
interval [0.94, 0.96] to values approximately in the middle between 0.7 and 0.95. Before the drop
in the upper-tail conditional expectation, the signal that θ is above th(β) is threatening enough
to prevent harmful consumption. After the drop, this is no longer the case, and the optimal IC
mechanism can no longer prevent harmful consumption. Yet at some point as β increases further,
the unconstrained-optimal mechanism becomes IC again. Lemma C.2 shows that λ-regularity puts
a bound on the derivative of the upper-tail conditional expectation function, thus preventing the
type of behavior observed in Figure C.1.
Proof of Corollary 3. According to (3)–(4) and (13), we can rewrite the probability of harmful
consumption as
F (tc)− F (th) = F (tc)− F
(
E[θ |θ > tc] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
.
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As observed in the main text, tc is strictly decreasing in β ∈ (1/(δ2C), βu). Hence it is sufficient
to show that
H(t) ≡ F (t)− F
(
E[θ |θ > t] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
(C.8)
is strictly increasing in t ∈ (tu, 1), where
tu ≡ 1 + β
uδ
(1 + δ)βuδ2C
.
Notice for future reference that, for each t ∈ (tu, 1),
t >
E[θ |θ > t] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
(C.9)
because, as βu is the unique value of β ∈ (1/(δ2C), 1) that achieves equality in (15), (C.9) becomes
an equality at t = tu and because, as P satisfies the strict monotone-hazard-rate property, the
mapping t 7→ (1 + δ)t−E[θ |θ > t] is strictly increasing over [0, 1). Then, for each t ∈ (tu, 1),
H ′(t) = f(t)− 1
1 + δ
f
(
E[θ |θ > t] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]}
≥ f(t)− 1
1 + δ
f
(
E[θ |θ > t] + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
> 0, (C.10)
where the first inequality again follows from the strict monotone-hazard-rate property, and the
second inequality follows from (17) and (C.9). Hence the result. 
Proof of Corollary 4. Defining H as in (C.8), we have
d
dβ
[F (tc)− F (ta)] > 0
in a strict right-neighborhood of β = 1/(δ2C) if and only if
H ′ < 0
in a strict left-neighborhood of t = 1 or, equivalently,
f(1)− 1
1 + δ
f
(
1 + 1/(δC)
1 + δ
)
lim inf
t→1
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]} < 0, (C.11)
according to (C.10). We need to show that (18) implies (C.11) if f(1) > 0 or, if f(1) = 0, if f
is nonincreasing in a left-neighborhood of t = 1.21 That is, we need to show that, under these
assumptions,
lim inf
t→1
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]} ≥ 1
2
. (C.12)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a sequence (tn)n∈N in (0, 1) converging to 1
such that, for some ε > 0,
d
dt
{E[θ |θ > t]}
∣∣∣∣
t=tn
<
1− ε
2
21Notice that, in the latter case, condition (18) is automatically satisfied.
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for all n. Then, according to (C.4), we have
f(tn)
{∫ 1
tn
θf(θ) dθ − tn[1− F (tn)]
}
− 1− ε
2
[1− F (tn)]2 < 0 (C.13)
for all n. Consider then the function
I(t) = f(t)
{∫ 1
t
θf(θ) dθ − t[1− F (t)]
}
− 1− ε
2
[1− F (t)]2.
We clearly have I(1) = 0. We now show that, under the stated assumptions on f , I is strictly
decreasing in a left-neighborhood of t = 1, which, given (C.13), yields the desired contradiction
as the sequence (tn)n∈N converges to 1. As I is continuous, it is sufficient to show that its right
upper Dini derivative D+I is strictly negative in a strict left-neighborhood of t = 1 (Giorgi and
Komlo´si (1992, Theorem 1.14)). Because f is continuous, the mapping t 7→ ∫ 1t θf(θ) dθ− t[1−F (t)]
is continuously differentiable. A simple calculation then shows that, for each t ∈ (0, 1),
D+I(t) = [1− F (t)](D+f(t){E[θ |θ > t]− t} − εf(t)).
Now, recall that f is strictly positive over (0, 1). Thus, if f(1) > 0, then D+I is strictly negative in
a strict left-neighborhood of t = 1 because the mean residual life E[θ |θ > t]− t converges to zero
as t goes to 1; similarly, if f(1) = 0, then, because the mean residual life E[θ |θ > t]− t is strictly
positive for all t ∈ [0, 1), the same conclusion obtains if f is nonincreasing and hence its right upper
Dini derivative D+f is nonpositive in a strict left-neighborhood of t = 1. Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For each βH ∈ (βL, 1), we denote by ta(βH), th(βH), tc(βH), and
t∗(βH) ≡ max{th(βH), tc(βH)} the relevant cutoffs defined in Sections 2–3. It follows from (3)–(4)
that ta and th are continuous. As for tc and t∗, notice that, for each βH ∈ (βL, 1), the assumption
that P has a continuous density f allows us to rewrite (13) as∫ 1
tc(βH)
θf(θ) dθ
1− F (tc(βH)) =
1
βHδ2C
, (C.14)
which implies, using again the assumption that f is continuous, that tc and t∗ are continuous as
well. Now, for each βH ∈ (βL, 1), define
ϕt∗L(βH) ≡ E[θ | t∗(βH) < θ ≤ t∗L]− ta(βH) =
∫ t∗L
t∗(βH)
θf(θ) dθ
F (t∗L)− F (t∗(βH))
− 1
βHδ2C
. (C.15)
Because f and t∗ are continuous, so is ϕt∗L . Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, we only
need to check that ϕt∗L(β
+
L ) < 0, that ϕt∗L(1) > 0, and that ϕt
∗
L
crosses zero only once. As for the
first two statements, we have
ϕt∗L(β
+
L ) = t
∗
L − ta(βL) and ϕt∗L(1) = E[θ | t∗(1) < θ ≤ t∗L]− ta(1),
and the result follows from t∗L < t
a(βL), t
∗(1) = ta(1) = th(1) < th(βL) ≤ t∗L, and the fact that P
has full support over [0, 1]. As for the third statement, we distinguish two cases.
Case 1 If βL < βH < β
u, with βu defined as in Corollary 2, then the unconstrained-optimal
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mechanism for type H is not IC and, therefore, t∗(βH) = tc(βH) > th(βH). In this case, from
(C.14)–(C.15), we have
ϕt∗L(βH) =
∫ t∗L
tc(βH)
θf(θ) dθ
F (t∗L)− F (tc(βH))
−
∫ 1
tc(βH)
θf(θ) dθ
1− F (tc(βH)) < 0
as t∗L < 1 and P has full support over [0, 1]. It follows that ϕt∗L cannot cross zero over (βL, β
u), and
thus the desired cutoff cannot belong to that interval.
Case 2 If βH ≥ max{βL, βu}, then the unconstrained-optimal mechanism for type H is IC and,
therefore, t∗(βH) = th(βH). In this case, we have
ϕt∗L(βH) = E
[
θ | t∗L ≥ θ >
1 + βHδ
(1 + δ)βHδ2C
]
− 1
βHδ2C
= φt∗L(βH),
where φt∗L(βH) is as defined in (C.2) with b = t
∗
L. As shown in the proof of Corollary 2, if P is
δ/(1 + δ)-regular, then φt∗L is strictly increasing and vanishes at a single point β
u
t∗L
, which defines
the desired threshold βneH (βL). That β
ne
H (βL) > β
u was shown in Case 1. That βneH (βL) is strictly
increasing in βL follows from the fact that t
∗
L = t
∗(βL) and, hence, φt∗L are strictly decreasing in
βL. Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 3. A useful preliminary observation is that, because the mechanism designer
always prefers a higher abstinence rate than the decision maker, we can neglect constraints (25)
and (27) in our quest for an optimal IC joint mechanism.
Lemma C.3 Any solution to the relaxed problem
max
 ∑
i=L,H
piβi{thi E[Πi(θ)]−E[θΠi(θ)]} : pi satisfies (24) and (26)
 (C.16)
is a solution to problem (28).
Proof. We show that any solution to (C.16) satisfies (25) and (27), and thus is a solution to (28).
We accordingly distinguish two cases.
Case 1 Suppose, by way of contradiction, that a solution (pi0, piL, piLH) to (C.16) violates (25).
Then type L would prefer to abstain whenever the recommendation is L. Because the utility from
consumption is weakly lower for the mechanism designer than for type L, the former prefers that
type L abstain in this case, and a fortiori that type H abstain as taH < t
a
L. Therefore, the joint
mechanism (pi0 + piL, 0, piLH) would satisfy (24) and (26) and improve upon the solution to (C.16),
a contradiction.
Case 2 Suppose, by way of contradiction, that a solution (pi0, piL, piLH) to (C.16) violates (27).
Then type H would prefer to abstain whenever the recommendation is LH. Because the utility
from consumption is weakly lower for the mechanism designer than for type H, the former prefers
that type H abstain in this case. Therefore, the joint mechanism (pi0, piL + piLH , 0) would satisfy
(24) and (26) and improve upon the solution to (C.16), once again a contradiction. The result
follows. 
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Among all joint mechanisms pi = (pi0, piL, piLH) that issue recommendation LH with some
probability γLH , those such that
piLH(θ) = 1{θ<tγLH}
for tγLH ≡ F−1(γLH) are the best for efficiency purposes as they minimize the expected harm from
consumption for a given probability of joint consumption. The following lemma shows that they
are also best at satisfying the incentive constraints (24) and (26), as they issue recommendations
to abstain to higher-risk types than any other joint mechanism with the same probabilities of
consumption recommendations that also satisfies these constraints.
Lemma C.4 For any joint mechanism pi = (pi0, piL, piLH) that satisfies (24) and (26), there exists
a joint mechanism p˜i = (p˜i0, p˜iL, p˜iLH) that also satisfies (24), (26), and such that
E[p˜ij(θ)] = E[pij(θ)], j = 0, L, LH, (C.17)
p˜iLH(θ) = 1{θ<tγLH} (C.18)
for γLH ≡ E[piLH(θ)] and tγLH ≡ F−1(γLH). Moreover, p˜i achieves a weakly higher value in (C.16)
than pi, and strictly so if pi does not satisfy (C.18) on a P-nonnull set.
Proof. We go back to the initial formulation of the optimal-design problem, in terms of direct
joint persuasion mechanisms. Specifically, let x : Θ×Ω→ {0, L, LH} be the direct joint persuasion
mechanism associated to pi, and, for each j ∈ {0, L, LH}, let
γj(tγLH ) ≡ P⊗ λ[{(θ, ω) ∈ Θ× Ω : x(θ, ω) = j ∧ θ < tγLH}]
be the probability that x issues recommendation j and θ < tγLH . Define a new direct joint
persuasion mechanism
x˜(θ, ω) ≡

LH if θ ≤ tγLH ,
L if θ > tγLH ∧
(
x(θ, ω) = L ∨
(
x(θ, ω) = LH ∧ ω < γL(tγLH )γ0(tγLH )+γL(tγLH )
))
,
0 if θ > tγLH ∧
(
x(θ, ω) = 0 ∨
(
x(θ, ω) = LH ∧ ω ≥ γL(tγLH )γ0(tγLH )+γL(tγLH )
))
,
and let p˜i ≡ (p˜i0, p˜iL, p˜iLH) be the corresponding joint mechanism. The direct joint persuasion
mechanism x˜ is constructed such that recommendation probabilities are the same as under x,
but consumption is recommended to both types if and only if θ ≤ tγLH . Hence (C.17)–(C.18)
hold by construction. Moreover, p˜i satisfies the incentive constraints (24) and (26), as it gives
recommendations to abstain to higher risk types than pi. Finally, p˜i weakly improves efficiency
upon pi, as it induces the same expected consumption levels with a lower expected harm from
consumption, and strictly so if pi does not satisfy (C.18) on a P-nonnull set. The result follows. 
Lemma C.4 implies that any solution pi∗∗ = (pi∗∗0 , pi∗∗L , pi
∗∗
LH) to (C.16) is such that, for some
cutoff t∗∗LH ,
pi∗∗LH(θ) = 1{θ≤t∗∗LH}
up to a P-null set. For any such joint mechanism, type H consumes if and only if θ ≤ t∗∗LH . Thus
his consumption behavior is already fully determined. Hence, given an optimal cutoff t∗∗LH , problem
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(C.16) reduces to finding a measurable function pi∗∗L : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that vanishes over [0, t∗∗LH ] and
that solves
max{thLE[piL(θ)]−E[θpiL(θ)] : pi satisfies (24) and (26)}. (C.19)
As in Section 3.2, the left-hand side of constraint (24) is not well defined if pi0 = 0 P-almost surely
over (t∗∗LH , 1), and similarly the left-hand side of constraint (26) is not well defined if pi0 = 0 P-
almost surely over (t∗∗LH , 1). To circumvent this problem, we again adopt the convention that the
undefined constraint is emptily satisfied, which allows us to linearize the constraints (24) and (26).
We start with an existence result.
Lemma C.5 Problems (C.19), (C.16), and (28) have a solution.
Proof. Our convention on the constraints (24) and (26) allows us to rewrite (C.19) as
max{thLE[piL(θ)]−E[θpiL(θ)] : E[θ[1− piL(θ)]] ≥ taLE[1− piL(θ)]
and E[θpiL(θ)] ≥ taHE[piL(θ)]}, (C.20)
where the maximum is taken over the set
S ≡ {piL ∈ L∞(P) : piL(θ) ∈ [0, 1] for all θ ∈ [0, 1] and piL(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [0, t∗∗LH ]}.
Notice that S is a closed subset of the unit ball BL∞(P) of L∞(P) when the latter set is endowed
with the weak∗ topology σ(L∞(P), L1(P)), which we henceforth assume without further mention.
By the Banach–Alaoglu compactness theorem (Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 6.21)), S is
thus compact in that topology, and so is by duality the set S′ of the functions in S that satisfy the
constraints in (C.20); notice furthermore that S′ is nonempty as it contains
piL(θ) = 1{taH<θ≤taL}1{θ>t∗∗LH}.
Because S′ is a nonempty compact set and the objective in (C.20) is continuous in piL by duality,
(C.20) and hence (C.19) have a solution.
To complete the proof, observe that, by Lemma C.3, we only need to show that (C.16) has a
solution. Treating t∗∗LH as a parameter, Berge maximum theorem (Aliprantis and Border (2006,
Theorem 17.31)) implies that the solutions to (C.19) as t∗∗LH varies are described by an upper
hemicontinuous correspondence $∗∗L : [0, 1]  BL∞(P) with nonempty compact values. Thus, by
Lemma C.4, (C.16) reduces to maximizing a continuous function of (t∗∗LH , pi
∗∗
L ) over {(t∗∗LH , pi∗∗L ) :
t∗∗LH ∈ [0, 1] and pi∗∗L ∈ $∗∗L (t∗∗LH)}, which is a compact set by the closed graph theorem (Aliprantis
and Border (2006, Theorem 17.11)). The result follows. 
We are now ready to characterize the solutions to (C.19).
Lemma C.6 Under Assumption 2, problem (C.19) has a solution of the form (30).
Proof. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 If constraint (26) is slack at the optimum, then (C.19) reduces to finding an optimal
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mechanism for type L alone, as described in Section 3. Proposition 1 yields that this mechanism
is given by
Π∗∗L (θ) = 1{θ≤t∗L},
so that
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗L}.
Hence we must have t∗∗LH = t
∗
H . We thus fall back on the joint mechanism (22), which is IC if and
only if the no-externality condition (23) holds.
Case 2 If constraint (26) is binding at the optimum, that is, according to Case 1, if the no-
externality condition (23) does not hold, then
E[θpiL(θ)]
E[piL(θ)]
= taH . (C.21)
Plugging (C.21) into the objective of (C.19), the problem becomes22
max{(thL − taH)E[piL(θ)] : pi satisfies (24) and (C.21)}. (C.22)
Our convention on the constraints (24) and (26) allows us to replace expectations in (C.22) by
integrals, yielding the equivalent problem
max
{
(thL − taH)
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
piL(θ)f(θ) dθ :
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− piL(θ)]f(θ) dθ ≥ taL
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− piL(θ)]f(θ) dθ
and
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θpiL(θ)f(θ) dθ = t
a
H
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
piL(θ)f(θ) dθ
}
,
where the maximum is taken over the set S defined in the proof of Lemma C.5. Because S is
convex, and the objective as well as the constraints are affine in piL, this equivalent problem is
convex. Therefore, by the Kuhn–Tucker theorem (Clarke (2013, Theorem 9.4)), for any solution
pi∗∗L to this problem, which is by construction a solution to (C.22) and (C.19), there exists a vector
of Lagrange multipliers (η∗∗, λ∗∗, µ∗∗) such that we have:
• Nontriviality:
(η∗∗, λ∗∗, µ∗∗) 6= (0, 0, 0). (C.23)
• Positivity:
η∗∗ ∈ {0, 1} and λ∗∗ ∈ R+. (C.24)
• Lagrangian maximization:
pi∗∗L ∈ arg max
{∫ 1
t∗∗LH
h∗∗(θ)piL(θ)f(θ) dθ : piL ∈ S
}
, (C.25)
where h∗ is the affine function defined by
h∗∗(θ) ≡ η∗∗(thL − taH) + λ∗∗taL + µ∗∗taH − (λ∗∗ + µ∗∗)θ.
22We keep the multiplicative constant thL − taH , which is strictly positive under Assumption 2, in order to
make Lemma C.6 relevant when this assumption does not hold, as in Proposition 4.
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• Complementary slackness:
λ∗∗
{∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ − taL
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ
}
= 0. (C.26)
• Equality constraint: ∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θpi∗∗L (θ)f(θ) dθ = t
a
H
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
pi∗∗L (θ)f(θ) dθ. (C.27)
We distinguish four subcases.
Subcase 2.1 If h∗∗(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (t∗∗LH , 1), then the objective in (C.25) is uniquely (up to a
P-null set) maximized over S by
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{θ≥t∗∗LH},
which corresponds to a cutoff t∗∗L = 1 in (30). Notice that (C.26) is automatically satisfied and that
(C.27) becomes
E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ] = taH .
Hence we must have t∗∗LH = t
∗
H . That is, type L always consumes and type H is facing his
individually optimal mechanism.
Subcase 2.2 If h∗∗(θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ (t∗∗LH , 1), then the objective in (C.25) is uniquely (up to a
P-null set) maximized over S by
pi∗∗L (θ) = 0,
which corresponds to a cutoff t∗∗L = t
∗∗
LH in (30). Notice that (C.27) is automatically satisfied, and
that (C.26) becomes
λ∗∗{E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ]− taL} = 0.
Hence we must have t∗∗LH = t
c
L if λ
∗∗ > 0.
Subcase 2.3 Suppose that h∗∗ changes sign over (t∗∗LH , 1)—so that, in particular, λ
∗∗+µ∗∗ 6= 0—
at the cutoff
t∗∗L ≡
η∗∗(thL − taH) + λ∗∗taL + µ∗∗taH
λ∗∗ + µ∗∗
.
We claim that λ∗∗ + µ∗∗ > 0. Indeed, if λ∗∗ + µ∗∗ < 0, then the objective in (C.25) is uniquely (up
to a P-null set) maximized over S by
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{θ≥t∗∗L }, (C.28)
so that
pi∗∗0 (θ) = 1{t∗∗LH<θ<t∗∗L }. (C.29)
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Now, given (C.29), (24) requires
E[θ | t∗∗LH < θ < t∗∗L ] ≥ taL. (C.30)
However, we know from Lemma C.3 that any solution to (C.16) and, hence, to (C.19) and (C.22),
is also a solution to (28). In particular, given (C.28), (25) requires
E[θ |θ ≥ t∗∗L ] < taL. (C.31)
Because (C.30)–(C.31) contradict each other, we obtain λ∗∗+µ∗∗ > 0, as claimed, and the objective
in (C.25) is uniquely (up to a P-null set) maximized over S by
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗∗L },
once again in line with (30).
Subcase 2.4 Suppose finally that h∗∗ is identically zero over (t∗∗LH , 1)—so that, in particular,
λ∗∗ + µ∗∗ = 0. Then
η∗∗(thL − taH) + λ∗∗(taL − taH) = 0.
Because taL > t
a
H , we have η
∗∗ = 1 by (C.24); otherwise, by (C.24) again, η∗∗ = λ∗∗ = µ∗∗ = 0,
which violates (C.23). Applying (C.24) yet again, we obtain taH ≥ thL, with equality if and only if
λ∗∗ = 0. Hence this subcase cannot arise under Assumption 2. The result follows. 
Proposition 3 is then an immediate consequence of Lemma C.6. Hence the result. 
Proof of Lemma 3. We solve (C.16) for the optimal cutoffs (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L )—the existence of which
we established in Proposition 3—under the assumption that the individually optimal mechanisms
with cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable, that is, (23) does not hold. We first
claim that we can restrict attention to cutoffs (tLH , tL) such that tL ≥ t∗L. To prove this claim, we
distinguish two cases. If t∗L > t
h
L, then (24) is satisfied if and only if tL ≥ t∗L. If t∗L = thL, then,
for any given tLH , any cutoff tL < t
h
L would induce an inefficiently high rate of abstinence for type
L and would tighten (26) compared to tL = t
h
L; hence an optimal cutoff tL must satisfy tL ≥ thL,
which is IC as thL = t
∗
L. The claim follows. Replacing expectations in (C.16) by integrals then yields
the equivalent problem
max
{
pLβL
∫ tL
0
(thL − θ)f(θ) dθ + pHβH
∫ tLH
0
(thH − θ)f(θ) dθ
}
, (C.32)
subject to the constraints ∫ tL
tLH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ ≥ 0, (C.33)
tL − t∗L ≥ 0, (C.34)
1− tL ≥ 0. (C.35)
The objective in (C.32) is continuous in (tLH , tL) and the feasible set defined by (tLH , tL) ∈ [0, 1]2
and (C.33)–(C.35) is compact. Hence problem (C.32)–(C.35) has a solution (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ). The proof
consists of four steps.
45
Step 1 We first show that t∗∗L > t
a
H > t
∗∗
LH ≥ thH in any solution (t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) to (C.32)–(C.35).
That t∗∗L > t
a
H follows from our preliminary observation that tL ≥ thL along with Assumption 2. As
for t∗∗LH , suppose, by way of contradiction, that t
∗∗
LH ≥ taH . Because t∗∗L > taH , we have∫ t∗∗L
taH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ > 0.
Hence lowering t∗∗LH to a value t
a
H − ε for some small ε > 0 would preserve (C.33) and strictly
increase the objective in (C.32), a contradiction. Thus taH > t
∗∗
LH , as claimed. The proof that
t∗∗LH ≥ thH is similar, observing that the left-hand side of (C.33) is strictly increasing in tLH ∈ [0, taH ]
and the objective in (C.32) is strictly increasing in tLH ∈ [0, thH ].
Step 2 We next verify that the constraints (C.33)–(C.35) satisfy the Mangasarian–Fromovitz
qualification conditions at (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) (Mangasarian (1969, 11.3.5)). Letting g be the mapping defined
by the left-hand sides of the binding constraints at (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ), we must prove that
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L )zT > 0
has a solution z ∈ R2, where ∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) is the Jacobian matrix of g at (t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ). This is obvious
if (C.33) is not binding. If (C.33) is binding, then the first line of ∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) is
Dg1(t
∗∗
LH , t
∗∗
L ) ≡
(
(taH − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH) (t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L )
)
.
We shall exploit the fact that f is strictly positive over (0, 1). Notice first that, because taH > t
∗∗
LH ≥
thH by Step 1, we always have (t
a
H − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH) > 0. If only (C.33) is binding, then 1 > t∗∗L > taH
by Step 1, so that (t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L ) > 0 and
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) = Dg1(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ).
We can then take any z ∈ R2++. Next, if (C.33) and (C.34) are binding, then t∗∗L = t∗L, so that
(t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L ) > 0 and
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) =
(
(taH − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH) (t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L )
0 1
)
.
We can then take any z ∈ R2++. Finally, if (C.33) and (C.35) are binding, then it is optimal to
have t∗∗LH = t
∗
H by Propositions 1–2, and
∇g(t∗∗LH , t∗∗L ) =
(
(taH − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH) (t∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L )
0 −1
)
.
We can then take z = (1, ε) for some small enough ε < 0.
Step 3 According to Step 1, constraints (C.33)–(C.35) are qualified at any solution (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L )
to (C.32)–(C.35). Therefore, by the Kuhn–Tucker necessary optimality conditions for nonconvex
optimization problems (Mangasarian (1969, 11.3.6)), there exists a vector of Lagrange multipliers
(ζ∗∗, ν∗∗, χ∗∗) such that we have:
• Positivity:
(ζ∗∗, ν∗∗, χ∗∗) ∈ R3+. (C.36)
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• First-order conditions:
pLβL(t
h
L − t∗∗L )f(t∗∗L ) + ζ∗∗(t∗∗L − taH)f(t∗∗L ) + ν∗∗ − χ∗∗ = 0, (C.37)
pHβH(t
h
H − t∗∗LH)f(t∗∗LH)− ζ∗∗(t∗∗LH − taH)f(t∗∗LH) = 0. (C.38)
• Complementary slackness:
ζ∗∗
∫ t∗∗L
t∗∗LH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ = 0, (C.39)
ν∗∗(t∗∗L − t∗L) = 0, (C.40)
χ∗∗(1− t∗∗L ) = 0. (C.41)
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1 Suppose first that (C.34) is binding, so that t∗∗L = t
∗
L and χ
∗∗ = 0 by (C.41), and
suppose further, by way of contradiction, that ζ∗∗ = 0. Then, by (C.38) along with the fact that
f(t∗∗LH) > 0 as t
a
H > t
∗∗
LH ≥ thH by Step 1 and f is strictly positive over (0, 1), we must have
t∗∗LH = t
h
H . Therefore, using the assumption that the individually optimal mechanisms with cutoffs
t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable, we obtain that
E[θ | t∗∗LH < θ ≤ t∗L] ≤ E[θ | t∗H < θ ≤ t∗L] < taH .
But then (C.33) is violated at (t∗∗LH , t
∗
L), a contradiction. Hence, by (C.36), ζ
∗∗ > 0, so that, by
(C.39), (C.33) must be binding at (t∗∗LH , t
∗
L). That is, t
∗∗
LH must satisfy∫ t∗L
t∗∗LH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ = 0. (C.42)
Because f is strictly positive over (0, 1), we have f(t∗L) > 0; moreover, as argued above, f(t
∗∗
LH) > 0.
Because χ∗∗ = 0 ≤ ν∗∗ by (C.36), the first-order conditions (C.37)–(C.38) rewrite as
pLβL(t
h
L − t∗L) + ζ∗∗(t∗L − taH) ≤ 0, (C.43)
pHβH(t
h
H − t∗∗LH)− ζ∗∗(t∗∗LH − taH) = 0. (C.44)
Because ζ∗∗ > 0 and t∗L ≥ thL > taH , (C.43) implies t∗L > thL. Hence the bracketed terms in (C.43)
are different from zero. Moreover, because the bracketed terms in (C.44) cannot simultaneously be
zero, none of them can be zero. We can thus divide (C.44) by (C.43), which yields
pHβH
pLβL
t∗∗LH − thH
t∗L − thL
≤ t
a
H − t∗∗LH
t∗L − taH
. (C.45)
Case 2 Suppose next that (C.35) is binding, so that t∗∗L = 1 and ν
∗∗ = 0 by (C.40). By
Proposition 1, it is then optimal to have t∗∗LH = t
∗
H . Because f is strictly positive over (0, 1), we
have f(t∗H) > 0. The first-order condition (C.38) then rewrites as
pHβH(t
h
H − t∗H)− ζ∗∗(t∗H − taH) = 0, (C.46)
so that t∗H > t
h
H if and only if ζ
∗∗ > 0. If f(1) > 0, then, because χ∗∗ ≥ 0 = ν∗∗ by (C.36), we can
also simplify (C.37) to obtain
pLβL(t
h
L − 1) + ζ∗∗(1− taH) ≥ 0. (C.47)
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The argument leading to (C.47) is a bit more involved if f(1) = 0. In that case, it follows from
(C.37) and ν∗∗ = 0 that χ∗∗ = 0 as well. Hence the relevant part of the Lagrangian, to be maximized
with respect to tL, can be written as∫ tL
t∗H
[pLβL(t
h
L − θ) + ζ∗∗(θ − taH)]f(θ) dθ,
which, as f is strictly positive over (0, 1), is maximum for tL = 1 only if (C.47) holds. By (C.36)
and (C.47), ζ∗∗ > 0, so that, by (C.39), (C.33) must be binding at (t∗H , 1). That is, t
∗
H must satisfy∫ 1
t∗H
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ = 0, (C.48)
which generically implies that t∗H > t
h
H , so that the unconstrained-optimal mechanism for type H
is not IC. The terms t∗H − taH and 1− taH in (C.46)–(C.47) are by construction different from zero.
We can thus divide (C.46) by (C.47), which yields
pHβH
pLβL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
≥ t
a
H − t∗H
1− taH
. (C.49)
Case 3 Suppose finally that (C.34)–(C.35) are not binding, so that ν∗∗ = χ∗∗ = 0 by (C.40)–
(C.41). As f is strictly positive over (0, 1), we have f(t∗∗L ) > 0 and, as argued in Case 1, f(t
∗∗
LH) > 0.
The first-order conditions (C.37)–(C.38) then rewrite as
pLβL(t
h
L − t∗∗L ) + ζ∗∗(t∗∗L − taH) = 0, (C.50)
pHβH(t
h
H − t∗∗LH)− ζ∗∗(t∗∗LH − taH) = 0. (C.51)
We must have ζ∗∗ > 0, and hence, by (C.39), (C.33) must be binding, for, otherwise, the individually
unconstrained-optimal mechanisms for types H and L would be simultaneously implementable.
That is, (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) must satisfy ∫ t∗∗L
t∗∗LH
(θ − taH)f(θ) dθ = 0. (C.52)
Because, as a result, the terms on the left- and the right-hand sides in each of (C.50)–(C.51) cannot
simultaneously be zero, none of them can be zero. Dividing yields
pHβH
pLβL
t∗∗LH − thH
t∗∗L − thL
=
taH − t∗∗LH
t∗∗L − taH
. (C.53)
Step 4 To complete the proof, we only need to delineate the circumstances under which each of
the cases discussed in Step 3 arises. In each case, (C.33) is binding, see (C.42), (C.48), and (C.52).
Let accordingly
TL ≡ {tL ≥ t∗L : there exists tH ≤ tL such that E[θ | tH < θ ≤ tL] = taH}. (C.54)
Because t∗L > t
a
H and E[θ | t∗H < θ ≤ t∗L] < taH as the individually optimal mechanisms with
cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable, t
∗
L ∈ TL. Because E[θ | tH < θ ≤ tL] is
strictly increasing in tH and tL, TL is thus an interval [t∗L, sup TL], and there exists a unique strictly
decreasing function tˆLH : TL → [0, taH) implicitly defined by
E[θ | tˆLH(tL) < θ ≤ tL] = taH . (C.55)
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By (C.42), (C.48), and (C.52), given t∗∗L , t
∗∗
LH is uniquely pinned down by
t∗∗LH = tˆLH(t
∗∗
L ). (C.56)
As f is strictly positive over (0, 1), a straightforward application of the implicit function theorem
implies that tˆLH is differentiable over the interior of TL, with
tˆ′LH(tL) = −
f(tL)
f(tˆLH(tL))
tL −E[θ | tˆLH(tL) < θ ≤ tL]
E[θ | tˆLH(tL) < θ ≤ tL]− tˆLH(tL)
< 0. (C.57)
While (C.56) holds in each of Cases 1, 2, and 3, these cases differ as to whether (C.45), (C.49), or
(C.53) holds. Defining accordingly
κ(tL) ≡ pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(tL)− thH
tL − thL
− t
a
H − tˆLH(tL)
tL − taH
, (C.58)
we have κ(t∗L) ≤ 0, κ(1) ≥ 0, and κ(t∗∗L ) = 0 in Cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. To conclude, we
only need to show that these cases are mutually exclusive. For this, we only need to show that κ
single-crosses zero, from above. Indeed, if κ(tL) = 0, then
κ′(tL) =
pHβH
pLβL
[
tˆ′LH(tL)
tL − thL
− tˆLH(tL)− t
h
H
(tL − thL)2
]
+
tˆ′LH(tL)
tL − taH
+
taH − tˆLH(tL)
(tL − taH)2
< − pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(tL)− thH
(tL − thL)2
+
taH − tˆLH(tL)
(tL − taH)2
=
[taH − tˆLH(tL)](taH − thL)
(tL − thL)(tL − taH)2
< 0, (C.59)
where the first inequality follows from (C.57), the second equality follows from (C.58) along with
κ(tL) = 0, and the second inequality follows from Assumption 2. Thus Case 1 occurs if and only if
κ(t∗L) ≤ 0, so that κ(tL) < 0 for all tL > t∗L, Case 2 occurs if and only if κ(1) ≥ 0, so that κ(tL) > 0
for all tL < 1, and Case 3 occurs if and only if κ(t
∗
L) > 0 and κ(1) < 0, so that κ(tL) changes sign
from positive to negative only at tL = t
∗∗
L . The result follows. 
Proof of Corollary 5. The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1 Consider first the boundary p, starting with the case t∗L > t
h
L. Define the function tˆLH
as in (C.55). By Assumption 2, t∗L > t
a
H , and, by construction, tˆLH(t
∗
L) < t
a
H . Moreover, because
the individually optimal mechanisms with cutoffs t∗H and t
∗
L are not simultaneously implementable,
tˆLH(t
∗
L) > t
∗
H and thus tˆLH(t
∗
L) > t
h
H . Hence
βH
βL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
> 0 and
taH − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
> 0.
As p 7→ p/(1−p) is a strictly increasing continuous mapping between (0, 1) and (0,∞), there exists
a unique p ∈ (0, 1) such that
pβH
(1− p)βL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
=
taH − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
,
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so that
pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
≤ t
a
H − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
if and only if pH ∈ [0, p]. Defining κ as in (C.58), we thus have κ(t∗L) ≤ 0 for any such pH . It then
follows from Step 4 of the proof of Lemma 3 that (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) = (tˆLH(t
∗
L), t
∗
L). We have thus proven
that, if t∗L > t
h
L, there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all pH ∈ (0, p], type L faces his individually
optimal mechanism. To complete the proof, we only need to check that if t∗L = t
h
L and type L faces
his individually optimal mechanism, so that t∗∗L = t
∗
L = t
h
L, then it must be that pH = 0, in which
case we can set p ≡ 0 by convention. Indeed, from (C.43) in Case 1 of the proof of Lemma 3, if we
impose the constraint (C.33), which is relevant only if pH > 0, then ζ
∗∗ > 0, and t∗∗L = t
∗
L implies
t∗L > t
h
L. Thus t
∗∗
L = t
∗
L = t
h
L implies pH = 0, as desired.
Step 2 Consider next the boundary p, starting with the case t∗H > t
h
H . Then
βH
βL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
> 0 and
taH − t∗H
1− taH
> 0.
As p 7→ p/(1−p) is a strictly increasing continuous mapping between (0, 1) and (0,∞), there exists
a unique p ∈ (0, 1) such that
pβH
(1− p)βL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
=
taH − t∗H
1− taH
,
so that
pHβH
pLβL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
≥ t
a
H − t∗H
1− taH
if and only if pH ∈ [p, 1]. Defining κ as in (C.58), we thus have κ(1) ≥ 0 for any such pH . It then
follows from Step 4 of the proof of Lemma 3 that (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) = (t
∗
H , 1). We have thus proven that, if
t∗H > t
h
H , there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all pH ∈ [p, 1), type H faces his individually optimal
mechanism. To complete the proof, we only need to check that if t∗H = t
h
H and type H faces his
individually optimal mechanism, so that t∗∗LH = t
∗
H = t
h
H , then it must be that pH = 1, in which
case we can set p ≡ 1 by convention. Indeed, from (C.46) in Case 2 of the proof of Lemma 3,
t∗H = t
h
H implies ζ
∗∗ = 0. Because t∗∗LH = t
∗
H implies t
∗∗
L = 1, (C.47) implies pL = 0, as desired.
Step 3 According to Steps 1–2,
pHβH
pLβL
tˆLH(t
∗
L)− thH
t∗L − thL
>
taH − tˆLH(t∗L)
t∗L − taH
and
pHβH
pLβL
t∗H − thH
1− thL
<
taH − t∗H
1− taH
if and only if pH ∈ (p, p). Defining κ as in (C.58), we thus have
κ(pH , t
∗∗
L ) =
pHβH
(1− pH)βL
tˆLH(t
∗∗
L )− thH
t∗∗L − thL
− t
a
H − tˆLH(t∗∗L )
t∗∗L − taH
= 0 (C.60)
for any such pH , where we make the dependence of κ on pH explicit. It then follows from Step 4
of the proof of Lemma 3 that (t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) is the unique solution to (34). Let us accordingly denote
by tˆL(pH) the unique solution to (C.60). We clearly have (∂κ/∂pH)(pH , tL) > 0 and, from (C.59),
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(∂κ/∂pH)(pH , tL) < 0 if κ(pH , tL) = 0. A straightforward application of the implicit function
theorem then implies that tˆL is differentiable over (p, p), with tˆ
′
L > 0. Summarizing, because, for
each pH ∈ (p, p),
(t∗∗LH , t
∗∗
L ) = (tˆLH(tˆL(pH)), tˆL(pH)),
where tˆLH is strictly decreasing over the interval TL by (C.57), the probabilities F (tˆLH(tˆL(pH)))
and F (tˆL(pH)) that type H and type L consume, respectively, are strictly decreasing and strictly
increasing in pH ∈ (p, p), respectively. Hence the result. 
Proof of Proposition 4. By Proposition 3, if Assumption 2 holds, then there exists an optimal
IC joint mechanism of the form (35) with t∗∗L = 1. Suppose then that Assumption 2 does not hold.
The result is immediate if we are in Case 1 or Subcases 2.1–3 of Lemma C.6; note, incidentally,
that we can be in Subcase 2.2, which, according to Lemma 3, cannot arise under Assumption 2.
There remains to consider Subcase 2.4 of Lemma C.6, in which the affine function h∗∗ is identically
zero over (t∗∗LH , 1).
Case 1 We first assume that taH > t
h
L. Then, by arguments already invoked, λ
∗∗ > 0 and, by
(C.26), any solution pi∗∗L to (C.19) must satisfy (C.27) and∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ = taL
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ. (C.61)
Notice that, because Lemma C.5 guarantees that a solution pi∗∗L to (C.19) exists, there exists a
solution to (C.27) and (C.61). Conversely, because h∗∗ is identically zero over (t∗∗LH , 1), any solution
to (C.27) and (C.61) is a solution to the maximization condition (C.25) and hence to (C.19) as this
is a convex problem and η∗∗ > 0 (Clarke (2013, Exercise 9.7)). Let us then fix a solution pi∗∗L to
(C.27) and (C.61). We focus with no loss of generality on the case where pi∗∗L is not equal to 1 or
to 0, P-almost surely over (t∗∗LH , 1); otherwise, we are back to Subcases 2.1 or 2.2 of Lemma C.6.
That is, we focus on the case where both constraints (24) and (26) in (C.16) are well defined and
binding. In particular, we must have
t∗∗LH < t
a
H < E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ] < taL. (C.62)
Summing (C.27) and (C.61) and rearranging, we obtain that any solution to (C.27) and (C.61)
satisfies ∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ = ρ ≡
E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ]− taH
taL − taH
[1− F (t∗∗LH)] < 1− F (t∗∗LH). (C.63)
We claim that, in line with (35), there exists a solution to (C.27) and (C.61) of the form
pi∗∗L (θ) = 1{t∗∗LH<θ≤t∗∗L } + 1{θ>t∗∗L }
for some cutoffs t∗∗L > t
∗∗
L > t
∗∗
LH . To prove this claim, we show that the system in (t, t)∫ t
t
θf(θ) dθ = taL[F (t)− F (t)] (C.64)∫ t
t∗∗LH
θf(θ) dθ +
∫ 1
t
θf(θ) dθ = taH [F (t)− F (t∗∗LH) + 1− F (t)], (C.65)
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has a unique solution. As above, summing (C.64)–(C.65) yields
F (t)− F (t) = ρ, (C.66)
and hence (C.64) rewrites as
ψ(t) ≡
∫ F−1(F (t)+ρ)
t θf(θ) dθ
ρ
= E[θ | t < θ ≤ F−1(F (t) + ρ)] = taL,
which we must solve for t ∈ (t∗∗LH , F−1(1 − ρ)]. By the intermediate value theorem, we only
need to check that ψ(t∗∗LH) < t
a
L, that ψ is strictly increasing over (t
∗∗
LH , F
−1(1 − ρ)], and that
ψ(F−1(1− ρ)) ≥ taL. The first statement follows from
ψ(t∗∗LH) = E[θ | t∗∗LH < θ ≤ F−1(F (t∗∗LH) + ρ)] < E[θ |θ > t∗∗LH ] < taL,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that F (t∗∗LH) + ρ < 1 by (C.66) and that P has full
support over [0, 1], and the second inequality follows from (C.62). The second statement follows
from a straightforward computation,
ψ′(t) =
f(t)[F−1(F (t) + ρ)− t]
ρ
> 0.
The third statement amounts to ∫ 1
F−1(1−ρ) θf(θ) dθ
ρ
≥ taL. (C.67)
But we know that there exists a solution to (C.27) and (C.61), which satisfies
taL =
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ
=
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− pi∗∗L (θ)]f(θ) dθ
ρ
by (C.63), and clearly∫ 1
F−1(1−ρ)
θf(θ) dθ = max
{∫ 1
t∗∗LH
θ[1− piL(θ)]f(θ) dθ :
∫ 1
t∗∗LH
[1− piL(θ)]f(θ) dθ = ρ
}
,
which yields the desired inequality (C.67). The claim follows. In case (C.67) holds as an equality,
we have t∗∗L = 1, and pi
∗∗
L has the same form as in Subcase 2.3.
Case 2 The proof for the limiting case taH = t
h
L or, equivalently, βH = β
no
H (βL), relies on a
simple continuity argument. From the proof of Lemma C.5, for each βH ≥ βnoH (βL), any solution to
(C.16) for βH can be represented by a pair (t
∗∗
LH(βH), pi
∗∗
L (βH)) ∈ [0, 1]×BL∞(P). Consider a strictly
decreasing sequence (βH,n)n∈N converging to βnoH (βL). By Berge maximum theorem (Aliprantis and
Border (2006, Theorem 17.31)) along with the fact that BL∞(P) is metrizable as L1(P) is separable
(Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorems 6.30 and 13.16)), any sequence ((t∗∗LH(βH,n), pi
∗∗
L (βH,n)))n∈N
of solutions to (C.16) for each term of the sequence (βH,n)n∈N has a subsequence that converges in
[0, 1] × BL∞(P) to a solution (t∗∗LH(βnoH (βL)), pi∗∗L (βnoH (βL))) to (C.16) for βnoH (βL). We can with no
loss of generality assume that this sequence converges. For each n ∈ N, we have βH,n > βnoH (βL)
and hence
pi∗∗L (βH,n)(θ) = 1{t∗∗LH(βH,n)<θ≤t∗∗L (βH,n)} (C.68)
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by Subcases 2.1–3 of the proof of Lemma C.6. Therefore,∫
pi∗∗L (β
no
H (βL))(θ) P(dθ) = limn→∞
∫
pi∗∗L (βH,n)(θ) P(dθ)
= lim
n→∞ F (t
∗∗
L (βH,n))− F (t∗∗LH(βH,n))
= lim
n→∞ F (t
∗∗
L (βH,n))− F (t∗∗LH(βnoH (βL))), (C.69)
where the first equality follows from the fact that the sequence (pi∗∗L (βH,n))n∈N converges in BL∞(P)
to pi∗∗L (β
no
H (βL)), using the definition of the weak
∗ topology σ(L∞(P), L1(P)), the second equality
follows from (C.68), and the third inequality follows from the fact that the sequence (t∗∗LH(βH,n))n∈N
converges to t∗∗LH(β
no
H (βL)) in [0, 1] and that F is continuous as P is nonatomic. Because F is strictly
increasing as P has full support, (C.69) implies that the sequence (t∗∗L (βH,n))n∈N converges to some
limit t∞. To complete the proof, notice that, for any Borel subset A of [0, 1],∫
A
pi∗∗L (β
no
H (βL))(θ) P(dθ) = limn→∞
∫
A
pi∗∗L (βH,n)(θ) P(dθ)
= lim
n→∞ P[A ∩ (t
∗∗
LH(βH,n), t
∗∗
L (βH,n)]], (C.70)
using again the definition of the weak∗ topology σ(L∞(P), L1(P)) along with (C.68). Finally,
we can substitute A = (t∗∗LH(β
no
H (βL), t∞] and A = (t∞, 1] in (C.70) and use the fact that the
sequence ((t∗∗LH(βH,n), t
∗∗
L (βH,n)))n∈N converges to (t
∗∗
LH(β
no
H (βL), t∞) to conclude that in fact t∞ =
t∗∗L (β
no
H (βL)) and
pi∗∗L (β
no
H (βL))(θ) = 1{t∗∗LH(βnoH (βL))<θ≤t∗∗L (βnoH (βL))}
up to a P-null set. Hence the result. 
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